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It 1© m  belief that so long as the two Governments 
maintain a perfectly appreciative attitude toward each 
other, so long as there is no lack of statesmanship to 
guide public opinion, the reign of peace and tranquility 
in our part of the world will remain unchallenged»
Viscount Ishli 
7 November 1917
ill
PREFACE
This paper has been written primarily to reveal the 
Japanese aide of the Lansing**Ishil negotiation© (or as it 
is referred to in Japan, the Ishli-Lansing negotiations), 
The main source for material on the Japanese position was 
microfilmed records of the Japanese Foreign Office obtained 
from the United States Library of Congress*
I wish to acknowledge the indispensable translation 
assistance provided by my wife Mltsuyo Endleott* Without 
her devotion the more than one hundred Foreign Office 
messages written in bureaucratic, T&isho Japanese would 
have never seen this writing*
We hope that this paper will contribute meaningfully 
to the historic scholarship on this often maligned 
agreement*
Tokyo, 1967
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CHAPTER I 
THE NEED FOR AN UNDERSTANDING
The Japanese government had become apprehensive and 
confused as to American policy In China by early 1917*
This uncertainty as to the intentions of her great eastern 
neighbor was the result, in large measure, of the inter­
play between the American Minister in Peiping, Paul 3* 
Relnsch, the State Department, and the Japanese themselves.
On the one hand was Relnsch, articulate spokesman for 
Chinese interests, often acting far beyond the normal call 
of duty for a diplomatic representative. In fact, on 
occasion he acted as confidential advisor to members of the 
Chinese Foreign Office, and he always did his utmost to 
counter and retard what he considered as Japanese com­
mercial, political and military encroachment Into China.*
On the other hand was the American State Department, 
headed during the first years of World War I by the silver- 
tongued William Jennings Bryan, and then, during the period 
considered in this paper, by Robert Lansing. Both men were 
champions of American commercial activity in China through 
adherence to the principles of equal opportunity and respect
*Paul S. Relnsch, An American Diplomat in China (Garden 
City, N.Y.J Doub 1 eday,“"page and 'Comp., 1§£277 P*~3W'4.
2for the open door. Both men had occasion to disavow the 
over zealous deeds of their Minister Relnsch.2
In Between, caught by some embryonic form of American 
"double diplomacy" was the Japanese government, guilty of 
encroachment as charged by the United States, but nonethe­
less, baffled by the contradictions of American diplomacy.
These contradictions did nothing to help the Japanese 
policy-makers in their drive to have a completed diplomatic 
position relative to China prior to the end of the First 
World War. Japan wanted the Shantung Peninsula and wished 
to secure all advances made at the expense of China and 
Germany during the war. In short, Japan hoped to insure 
diplomatically that which she held by force of arms*3
The Japanese had become party to the Declaration of 
London, and had signed individual pacts with the various 
Allies to assure her position and desiderata at the con­
ference table. When the United States entered the war and
likewise gained a seat at the post-war peace negotiations,
ashe too had to be reckoned with.
2U.S. Department of State, Foreign Relations of the
United States* 1917 (Washingtons ~u'.S. Governmenfc PrTnlTng
SITIce. T5^5T7 p. 117.
^A. Whitney Griswold, The Far Eastern policy of the 
United States (New Haven and londonl 7ale (Mive rslty""feeas,
155577 pTWT-
^Ibid. The Declaration of London of September* 5$ 191^$ 
was a mutual declaration by England, France and Russia not 
to consider peace with Germany except by general agreement 
among the three allied powers.
3Japan had received the Bryan Mote of March, 1915# 
during the period of the controversy over the Twenty-one 
Demands* This note apparently conceded certain Interests 
in China to Japan*^ Two months later, she had received 
the May, 1915# caveat which had the effect of negating 
the March note*^
Which note represented the time American policy? Did 
Relnsch speak for himself or for the State Department?
These questions, among others, plagued the Japanese and 
underlined the need to arrive at a settlement with the 
United States. A settlement which, It was hoped, could 
unravel these seemingly endless contradictions.
The United States, on the other hand, had every reason 
to desire an understanding with Japan* American attention 
was being diverted from the Pacific area by full partici­
pation In the European war. Mils©n desired that Chinese 
territorial integrity be respected as well as her political 
independence,1^ and the State Department had strong reason
^U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relations of the 
United States* 1915 (Washington: THIST' oovernSeiSi^'TrlntTng
Tsmsi, iggtTTppT 105- m .
6Ibid.
^Burton F. Beers, Vain Endeavor, Robert Lansing9s
Attempts to End the Amerl'c'an-^ 'Spaneae MvaYry (iXarham,
H.C.: 15uil University Tfreas, l§fe£), p7,n2$ and pp. 16-17♦
4to suspect that Japan had a current Interest In a German 
ftdetente.
As early as 1916, Lansing had received information 
from the American Ambassador in Tokyo, Guthrie, that Japan 
was interested in a settlement with the United States, 
Guthrie was able to report what concessions the Japanese 
government might fee willing to make. These points generally 
revolved around the following items: Japan might promise to
drop her complaints about the immigration issue; might sur­
render her claims to German political and military rights 
in Shantung; and American commercial Interests in China 
proper would not be resisted.^
In return, Japan would expect recognition of the
existence of her special interests In South Manchuria, and
10acquiescence in Japanese leadership of East Asia*
Such wishful thinking was not limited to the Japanese# 
Americans also were predisposed to working out some-kind- 
of-agreement with the Japanese* In Burton F. Beers* book 
Vain Endeavor, an interesting thesis is found with regard 
to Lansing*© concept of a Far Eastern settlement based 
strictly on American commercial Interests. Beers explains
®Frank W* Xkle. *Japanese-German Peace Negotiations 
during World War I, The American Historical Heview, LXXI 
(October, 1965), pp* 6 2 - 7 6 * ..
9Beers, 0£. oit., p. 104.
10lbid.
5that Lansing's ideas went so far as to encompass the trans­
fer of the Philippines to Japan in order to eliminate the 
basic Far East weakness of the United States*
With reference to China, Lansing had outlined his 
interpretation of American policy when, acting for Bryan 
in 191^# he had informed Keinsch that in China ,r. * * 
America’s primary aim was to safeguard all American rights 
in China, to protect all legitimate American interests 
there and promote by all proper methods the development of 
American trade.fl12 He was emphatic that China’s territorial 
Integrity and its defense should not involve the United 
States in international difficulties.1^
Lansing’s grand scheme for a Japanese-American settle­
ment based purely on American economic interests ran head­
long into what may be called “Wilsonian logic•M What 
Wilson envisaged as the United Stated role in China was 
preservation of China’s administrative and territorial 
integrity through strict adherence to the open door* He 
hoped to help China develop along “modern, democratic, 
and Christian lines.h1^
n m a .t pp. 108-109.
*2U.S., Department of State, Foreign Relatione of the 
United States-191^ (Washington! U.S. Government Printing 6tm&, "TSaSTTppT 189-190.
13Ibld.
^Beera, op. eit., p. 29 and pp. 16-17.
6When an opportunity presented itself for possible 
high level talks to clarify American policy, the Japanese 
were quick to act* Such an .occasion occurred on May 12,
19IT, during talks in Washington between Japanese Ambas­
sador Sato and the American Secretary of State Robert 
Lansing, During the meeting, the American Secretary 
mentioned to Ambassador Sato that the sending of a 
special envoy to the United States would "greatly con­
tribute to the friendly relations between the two 
nations.n1^
Sato received the idea most favorably and set about 
to convince the folcyo government of its desirability.
In a cable to Minister for Foreign Affairs Motono, Sato 
reported the conversation and expressed the opinion that 
since Russia, Italy, Britain and France had sent, or were 
preparing to send, delegations to the United States, It 
would seem most appropriate for Japan to do likewise. He 
reported that Secretary Lansing had suggested that the 
mission should appear to be Japanese-initiated and not 
at America1s request,
^^Hlikomatsu Kamlkawa, Japan-Aroerican Diplomatic 
Relations in the MeiJ1 -Tajsii'6 SraT1 'traiSIa¥ea'Ey1S7"""fUraura 
X¥oi^roT*w Pan-Fac 1 i?i c £  re's i, rI95B7, p. 339*
^Japan, Foreign Office Documents, Cable 186, Sato to 
Motono, May 15," 1917 * "TBter^ ihatf fcer "referred to as Foreign 
Office,)
7Sato and Lanaing also discussed the possibility of 
sending an American mission to Japan, Lansing indicated 
that perhaps Mr, Elihu Root, former American Secretary of 
State, could visit Japan, but nothing substantive came from 
this meeting* Sato commented to Tokyo that it "appeared“ 
as if the United States wished to resolve existing problems 
between the two countries. ^
In a follow-up cable, Sato pointed out to hi© govern­
ment that since the release of the Zimmerman Telegram, "much 
ill will is found in the United States toward Japan and the 
Japanese,” implying that the visit of a special mission 
could help relieve tensions between the two nations.
Sato also reported to Tokyo that Lansing would probably 
talk on matters relative to the more efficient use of sup­
plies by the Allies, and on Pacific s e c u r i t y . 3^  However, 
on May 22nd, Sato forwarded a letter from Lansing which 
stated that at this early stage, he did not want to get 
bogged down with agenda items* The American secretary
recommended that the mission be publicly identified only
20as congratulatory In nature*"
loporeiKn Office, Unnumbered cable, Sato to Motono,
May 22, i^ l'f ( receTvid).
19lbld.
20ForelKn Office, Cable 187, Sato to Motono, May 17, 
1917 (received).
aForeign Minister Motono replied in a cable sent to
Sato on May 22nd* that he .agreed with the idea of sending
a special mission. He said the next step was to decide who
would head the mission# Sato was instructed to keep the
21matter secret for the time being#
On the 25th of May, Motono received another dispatch 
from Sato forwarding Lansing*s comments about a meeting#
The American Secretary of State had agreed in the necessity 
for a special mission, and said that secrecy should be 
maintained for the present# He suggested haste in sending 
the mission once Its coa^osition was decided*^
On the 30th, Motono instructed Sato to question Lansing 
as to the acceptability of the Viscount Ishii and a sup­
porting staff for the mission#2^ Sato replied on the 31st 
that he had met with Lansing and the latter said he would
ph.
be very happy to welcome the Viscount*
^Foreign Office, Cable 159# Motono to Sato, May 22, 
1917 (dispat'cSed) •
^Foreign Office* Cable 195, Sato to Motono, May 25, 
1917 (received).
Foreign Office, Cable 167, Motono to Sato, May 30, 
1917 (dispatched)*
^Foreign Office# Cable 209# Sato to Motono# May 31* 
1917 (dlipatcHedyi---
CHAPTER II
DIPLOMATIC PREPARATIONS
On June 15, 1917, shortly after Ishil had been con­
firmed as special envoy, the Japanese Ambassador to the 
United States called on Secretary of State Lansing to 
protest an early-June note sent by the American secretary 
to the Chinese government counseling It to end internal 
strife before entry into the World War. Sato Indicated 
that his government considered the note to be gross inter­
ference in Chinese matters at a time when his government 
considered China the prime responsibility of Japan. 
Specifically Sato stated:
• • * as Japan has a predominate interest in 
China, politically and economically* Japan will 
suffer greater damages than any other nation if 
conditions become serious. However* Japan takes 
a policy of non-interference toward China and so* 
does not intend to make anyproposal concerning 
this political crisis . . .
Ambassador Sato then injected the Bryan Hot© of March 
13, 1915, into the conversation* and asked that the not©, 
especially the portion referring to Japan’s Mspecial and
m2close relations, political as well as economic . . .  b©
^Kamlkawa* op. oit.* pp. 335-336.
2U • 3* Department 01 State* Forsijgn JRelations^  of the 
United States-1917 (Washingtons ' t/.S.Goverrmfent 'Printing
Of f ice * JY'p. ”259 - (Hereinafter referred to as Foreign
Relations-1917.)
10
reaffirmed. He handed the following note to the American 
Be ere taryi
The government of the United States well knows 
that Japan has special and close relation® with 
China, both political end economic. Secretary of 
State Bryan recognized this fact and stated that 
the activities of Americans in China were not 
political In his letter to Ambassador Chinda of 
March 13, 1913 . * . f because Japanese public 
opinion is particularly sensitive to the problem 
of China* . . ♦ rumors of the American conduct 
has created uneasiness among some Japanese. For 
the above reason* it will favorably impress the 
general public of Japan and contribute to the 
friendly relations between the United States and 
Japan if the United States government re-affIrm 
in some way the Bryan statement and clearly con­
firm that the United State® will take a friendly 
policy on China toward Japan. The government of 
Japan hereby frankly expresses its beliefs and 
asks the intentions of the government of the 
United States,3
During the conversations and in the note mentioned 
above, Sato did not distinguish between all of China and 
those parts contiguous to Japan when he addressed Lansing, 
and he referred quite obviously to political interests. 
Lansing at the time failed to catch the significance. He 
replied that he thought the note was "in accord with the 
deep sense of the memo. Unwittingly, Lansing had played 
the "straight-man11 for a Japanese maneuver to improve its 
bargaining position.
^Kamikawa, 0£. Cit., pp. 336-337. 
Porelan Relations-1917. p. 259.
XI
Several clays latex1 this was made patently clear to 
Lansing when the American Charge d*Affairs in Tokyo# Mr*
Post Wheeler# forwarded a dispatch containing the Japanese 
version of the Sato-Lansinc conversation. It had been
translated as "Japan possessed paramount Interests both
bpolitical and economic in China." Lansing informed 
Ambassador Sato that his statement of June 15th was 
meant "to vary in no way the formal declaration of Mr*
Bryan * , , u  The Japanese diplomatic probe had been recog­
nized and parried.
Although there is no record in the Foreign Office 
microfilms as to whether this mot/e by Sato was directed 
by Motono or self-initiated# it does fit into a broad 
pattern of Intense Japanese activity in preparation for 
the Lansing-Xshll meeting* On June 10# 1917# Vice Admiral 
Takeshita, who was senior naval member of the special 
mission# received detailed instructions from Imperial 
Naval Headquarters;^* on the 12th Prime Minister Terauchl 
outlined his government1s broad objectives to the Foreign
%.S., Department of State# Foreign Relations of the 
United States-The Lansing Papers IWasMnglon* “"HJTS#Hsovernment
p. 430.
^Foreign Relations-1917# pp. 260-262.
^Foreign Office* Letter from Imperial Navy Headquarters 
to Vico Admiral Takeshita# June 10, 1917*
8Office; and on the 19th, Lt. General Sugano, who repre­
sented the Imperial Japanese Army, received hie complete 
Instructions from Imperial Army Headquarters.^
A detailed examination of these three communiques 
sheds significant light on the attitudes, sincerity and 
desiderata of the Japanese government.
The June 10, 1917* letter to Vice Admiral Takeshita 
from Imperial Navy Headquarters informed him that he would 
have authority to assist Ishli on naval matters; that he 
would soon have available for review the Foreign Office 
instructions given to Viscount Ishli, and that specific 
Instructions relating to naval questions were attached.
He was enjoined to do background study on unspecified 
'* Important problems.11
His detailed Instructions revealed a Japan that was 
ready to make concrete and rather astonishing proposals 
concerning Pacific security. Takeshita was informed that 
upon request from America, Japan would be willing t© patrol 
the area west of ISO degrees In the Pacific, and that
^Foreign Office, Letter from prime Minister Terauehi 
to Foreign' Minister'Motono, June 12, 1917 *
^Foreign Office, Letter, Instructions for Military 
Member of the Special Migslon,‘'"InFoxmiaiTon copy'" to'Tlie
SorelgnTlSf £ ice 'from" the Imperial Army Headquarters,
June 19, 1917.
lQForeign Office, Letter from Imperial Navy Head- 
quarters to Vice Admiral Takeshita, June 10, 1917*
13
Japanese naval forces would be made available for patrol 
duty in the Manila-Gusm and Hawaii-San Francisco areas If 
requested* He was cautioned not to volunteer this infor­
mation, but rather he was to let America do the requesting* 
In the event United States naval authorities did request 
Japanese participation in Pacific security, the following 
ships were to be made available:
If any of these ships were required, Flee Admiral 
Takeshita was instructed to obtains United States agree­
ment to use American naval facilities on a “no-red-tape” 
basis! a refueling/refitting agreement where the United 
States would provide supplies and Japan would pay; and 
permission to use American cable/telegraph facilities if 
needed *12
Concerning the sending of supplies to the Allies,
Vice Admiral Takeshita*s instructions read like those of 
a naval lobbyist* He was directed to inform the Americans 
that the Japanese Navy was Immediately capable of producing 
effective weapons and related military Items and that the
Manlla~Guam area- 
1 battle cruiser 
12 cruisers 
1 or 2 destroyer 
squadrons depending 
on the need.
San Francisco^Hawall area- 
2 or 3 Tokiwa Class
cruisers
1 or 2 destroyer squad­
rons again depending on 
the need*-*--**
11Ibid
12Ibid
national arsenals were constructed to function on a perma-
nent basis. Along this same line, he was instructed to
endeavor to obtain access to raw materials at that time
13denied to Japan by the United State®.
Takeshita*s instructions returned to the question of 
naval vessels but in a somewhat larger reference than 
earlier;
If in the Mediterranean and Pacific Areas the United 
States requests more Japanese ships, the Imperial 
Wavy will cooperate with the Allied countries to the 
utmost; however, a® the majority of the new type 
cruiser® are already in the Mediterranean and the 
remaining cruiser© are In the Pacific area pro­
tecting ships from enemy raiders or in for repairs, 
it will be rather difficult to offer more ships*
The entire matter depends on the course of the war 
and, of course, pacific security is related.1*
Takeshita1© instructions concluded by saying that 
America*s true intentions toward Japan would be Judged 
through these meetings.^
Two days later, on June 12, 1917, Prime Minister 
Terauehi sent very general instructions to Foreign Minister 
Motono concerning the coming special mission. Q He reviewed 
the fact that a special mission was going to be sent to the
13Ibld.
l4Ibld.
^Porelttn Office, Letter from Prime Minister Terauehi 
to Foreign Minister Motono, June 12, 1917.
l6 IbicJ.
15
United States to demonstrate Japan1s sincerity in America's 
entry into the war, and to discuss other Important matters* 
Terauehi said that it seemed as if the United States wished 
to conclude an agreement on supplying goods to the Allies, 
Pacific security and other thing® associated with the war.
The Prime Minister pointed out that the talks should bo used 
as a means to open discussion on anything disturbing Japa­
nese- American friendshipi however, he stressed especially 
two subjectst the position of Japanese in the United States
"I
and Imperial Japanese interests in China.
Under the second subject, Terauehi emphasised the need 
to give? a clear understanding of Japanese Interests to the 
United States, and the question of harmonising the future 
actions of both countries In China. Motono was cautioned 
to use care in reaching an agreement on these two matters 
as they were considered extremely critical to future Japa­
nese -American relations. The Instructions end with Terauehi 
directing Motono and Xahli to get together to discuss the 
matter.*®
One week after Terauehi informed the Galmusho (foreign 
office) of Japan's broad objectives, Lieutenant General Sugano
17Ibld
l8Ibld
received his instructions from Imperial Army Headquarters.^ 
The Foreign Office received a copy of the Army1s instruc­
tions through its Bureau of Military Affairs.
These instructions, dated June 19, are quite revealing. 
They begin by Infoi^ming the general that he has been 
selected to be a member of the special mission, and that 
he is to assist the mission as necessary* he is instructed 
to keep the following points in minds
a. To maintain Allied strategic capability and 
also Improve it, you must know how many weapons 
and military supplies are available to the United 
States and Japan. Each party must understand how 
it can best help in this area.
b. If United States Pacific Fleet has to move to 
the Atlantic due to United States involvement in 
the war, japan will take the responsibility for 
Pacific security if the United States so desires.
If the United State® desires to give the Philip­
pines its independence or give it or Guam to 
another power In the future, Japan should be con­
sulted first.
c. As a matter of policy, the Japanese Army will 
not go to Europe.20
The next item (d.) la without a doubt an effort to 
collect information on the mobilization capability of the 
United States. General Sugano is asked to obtain infor­
mation on the following items: the American Army plan for
deployment to Europe % and facts on the wartime expansion
^Although the addressee is not readily apparent on 
the paper, I am assuming that the correspondence was 
addressed to Lt. General Sugano. Foreign Office, Letter, 
Instructions for Military Member of tHe spa c "fa if Mi s si on, 
Information copy to Foreign Sffice, June 157 I§lT*
20Ibid.
17
of the United States Army. It was added parenthetically, 
but nonetheless emphatically, that the Imperial Japanese 
Army did not like fee have the American military functioning
In Siberia.
The information requested In these "research Items" 
is most interesting* It will be recalled that it was a 
little-heId secret that the sympathies of a great number 
of Imperial Army personnel were with the Central Powers.
It is conceivable that information gathered on United 
States mobilisation and deployment schedules would be used 
t© "cover all bets."
The point parenthetically made Is also thought-pro­
voking. Was Japanese Army opposition to American forces 
moving across Siberia due to. Siberia's proximity to 
Manchuria and the Japanese presence there, or was the 
Imperial Army anticipating a Russian collapse and did not 
want American forces readily available to fill a possible 
power vacuum? These instructions to General Sugano were
almost coincidental with the dispatch of 50*000 Japanese
21troops to Manchuria,
The subparagraph dealing with the China situation 
was so dynamic and pertinent to latex1 discussions that it 
Is quoted here as translated?
eers, op. clt., p. 112.
18
0* Japan respects all countries* business and 
Industrial opportunity in China. At the same time, 
Japan has a special position geographically and 
historically# Malm clear Japan's special political 
position in China, and the fact that Japan will not 
allow any American activity In China besides 
econoraicT^  CItaXle¥ TS n e .)
this highly militant section makes it clearer why the 
Japanese reacted so emphatically to Lansing*s June 4, 1917 
letter relative to China entering the war and to the various 
obtrusive moves by Relnsch* Evidently Japan was under the 
impression that she had obtained recognition of political 
suzerainty over China through the Bryan note, and was 
endeavoring to have it confirmed.
Concluding these instructions in subparagraph f was 
the Issue of the position of Japanese immigrants in the 
United States.
Lieutenant General Sugano was ordered to make his
preparations complete for the mission, and he was further
informed that instructions would be sent to him if any
23problems developed.
An interesting insight may be gained into the Japanese 
government by reviewing these three sets of instructions.
On the one hand one observes that the Navy which was
^Foreign Office. Letter, Instructions for Military 
Member of' SpecialMission, Information copy to Foreign
5 F F I c e , ^ u n e "^ f ~ l W : ----
23ibld.
19
British-trained and generally pro-ally stressed tfutmost 
cooperation” in its instructions. The Anay, on the other 
hand, with Prussian traditions and considered pro-Central 
Power, asked its representative to obtain Information on 
present military strengths, logistical backup, mobilisation 
and expansion data, deployment schedules and went so far 
as to tell its representative to make it clear that the 
presence of American officials in China would be tolerated 
only as long as their efforts were directed towards economic 
matters. In the middle, and attempting to synthesize the 
two, was the Terauchi government. It stressed the need to 
give a "clear understanding” to the United States of Japa­
nese interests in China while not providing America with 
a cauaua belli.
While preparations continued for instructing the 
various key individuals in the intentions of the several 
departments, the Galmuaho took steps to confirm the com­
position of the special mission. On the 13th of June,
Motone sent Ambassador Sato in Washington a proposed list 
of attendees.^ Ishll was listed as mission head with 
Vic© Admiral Takeshita, Lieutenant General Sugano, Mr.
Nagai, Commander Ando, Lieutenant Colonel Tanigawa, and 
Vice Counsulor Imai as his supporting diplomatic staff 
and naval/military advisors.
Foreign Office, Cable 186, Motono to Sato, June 13* 
1917 (dTipitcheWy:---
20
Sato was instructed to relay this list of individuals 
to the American government and obtain its approval. The
Wilson administration had already informed Japan on May
2531st, of its willingness to accept Ishil, and on June
16th, Mr. Post Wheeler, the Charge d*Affairs in Tokyo,
informed the Japanese Foreign Ministry that the United
States would be "delighted* to welcome the entire mission
to the United States*^
The news of the Japanese special mission was released
to the American press, and a very~interested Sato reported
to his home government a favorable editorial which had
appeared in the Hew York World on June l6.2^
On the 5th of July, the American Secretary of War,
Mewton D. Baker, visited Ambassador Sato to discuss the
28coming mission and specifically its itinerary. Baker 
proposed that the mission visit numerous cities on its 
way from San Francisco to Washington, D.C., in order to 
stimulate good relations between the United States and 
Japan, but particularly to let Americans see the visitors
^Foreign Office, Cable 209, Sato to Motone. May 31,
1917.
^Foreign Office, Cable 822, Wheeler to Motono, June
i&, 1917#
0*7'’“'‘Foreign Office, Cable 228, Sato to Motono, June 19, 
1917 (receive8).
^Foreign Office, Cable 243, Sato to Motono, July 5, 
1917 (receive*!).
from the remote Orient. He especially pointed out Denver,
Kansas City and Saint Louis as the kind of cities he hoped
Ishil would visit. On the return trip from Washington, he
suggested that the mission visit cities on the East coast
and then take the southern route through Texas to Los 
29Angeles.
To Sato, it was obvious that the United States was 
going to use the mission to stimulate the personal, involve* 
ment of Its nationals in the war. This was true with regard 
to the people of the Southwest States who, according to the 
Secretary of War, were very cold or ignorant of the war.
In the true fashion of any bureaucrat, Sato was reeled by 
such a schedule for the Viscount, and he replied to Secre* 
tary Baker that he did not like the Idea of Ishil meeting 
so many people and visiting so many cities prior to his 
formal introduction to the President and other high govern* 
ment officials. He pointed out that the missions of 
Britain, France and other countries had visited only 
twelve cities, nothing so arduous as that being proposed 
for Ishil. He, of course, did not say "yes” or "no," 
but agreed to forward the problem on to his government.30
Secretary Baker stressed the thought that the Ishil 
Mission would be extraordinary, implying greater
2%bid.
3°ibid.
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expectations from the Japanese than from either the British
or French. Finally, he stated that he believed the Presi-
31dent would not be opposed to hi© proposal.
& reply to Sato1© report of the Baker visit was
dispatched two days later from Tokyo. The entire matter
of Ishil1© itinerary was taken care of in a very efficient,
but typically Japanese manner. "Ishil 1© not good at
making speeches . * . so to give so many would be diffi- 
„32cult for him. For the moment, the issue rested.
On the 24th of July, five days before Ishil and hi© 
entourage left for Honolulu, the Cabinet, meeting in 
Council Session, decided to give further private instrue- 
tions for the Viscount. These Instructions were for- 
warded in two pieces of correspondence. The first, drawn 
up In rather general terras consisted of the decisions of 
the Cabinet Council and was so designated. The second, 
an attachment to the first, was a more lengthy and detailed 
review of Japanese policy and objectives for the mission.
34
It was entitled simply, "Instructions for Viscount Ishil.1 
31Ibld.
32Forelgn Office, Cable 219, Motono to Sato, July 7, 
1917 (dTspltcReSn---
33J?orelfm Office, Letter, Decisions of the Cabinet 
Council on the Ishi'i Mission an<S InstructTons for Viscount
r s % r i T ~ j C T y T * T , " W I 7 .------------------------------------------------
34Ibid.
23
As both documents are germane to an evaluation of the 
success or failure of the mission* the present writer will 
review their contents at length* In the communique 
entitled ’’Decisions of the Cabinet Council on the Ishil 
Mission*w the envoy Is enjoined on four points?
1. First* he Is directed to meet fresident Wilson 
and deliver the congratulations of Japan upon the United 
States entry into the war as an Ally.
2. Second* he is advised that it appears that the 
United States desires to make a pact on Pacific security 
and related matters* Ishil Is told that the Japanese 
government will cooperate to the fullest extentj however, 
discussions relating to this question are to be initiated 
by the United States.
3* Third* the Cabinet memorandum asks that Ishil 
make Japan’s thoughts and desires on China clearly known 
to the United States* In this vein* he is instructed to 
follow the more detailed directive which is attached.
4* Fourth, the general instructions conclude 
with a brief review of Japanese policy toward the German 
pacific Islands occupied by Japanese forces* As the 
Japanese government is determined to obtain these islands 
at the conclusion of the war* Ishil is told to indicate* 
at an appropriate moment, his government’s concern that 
German ownership of these Pacific islands after the war
24
would be a source of trouble In the future, As Britain, 
France and Russia had already Informally agreed to transfer 
the Islands to Japan, Ishti was Instructed to most dis­
creetly broach the subject with appropriate authorities.
It was felt that asking for American consent to- the 
proposition would be appropriate, but Ishil was warned 
to hint only at this time*^
The attached paper, referred to above In Item 3, Is 
entitled "Instructions for Viscount Ishil.n This memo­
randum is quoted practically in its entirety as translatedi
The government of Japan thinks it most essential 
to establish a lasting and solid international 
friendship between Japan and the United States, 
and wishes to eradicate all the conditions that 
are feared might cause troubles in international 
relations In the future* The American policies 
at which the Japanese are chagrined are the 
American political and economic activities in 
China and the unfair and prejudicial treatment 
of Japanese in the United States.
1. The Problem of American Activities In China* 
American Interests In China are mainly economic, 
none of which is ^ l c7 of vital Importance to the 
destiny of the united States* In the case of Japan 
in China; however, Japan far surpasses the United 
States in capital Investment. Economically, and 
politically, the Japanese interests in China are 
unparalleled, and of special and vital Importance 
to the destiny of Japan* Haturally, if any nation 
tries to establish political influence In China in 
disregard of the Japanese position and impairing 
Japanese Interests, Japan will have to take 
measures to defend her interests* For the above 
reasons, the Japanese are particularly sensitive 
about international problems concerning China*
The government of Japan believes that the United
35|bld.
States government recognises these circumstances. 
It I© a matter of fact that Japan1© policy of 
maintaining the 3 *if pendence and territorial 
integrity of China has not changed. Japan is 
willing to reaffirm this policy if the United 
States thinks it necessary.
Regarding the economic activities of the 
United States in China* Japan has no intention 
to obstruct them if they do not encroach on 
Japanese special interests. A fair and Just 
competition guarantees the people of the world 
free and equal opportunities. Under the present 
conditions in China; however* the cooperation of 
capitalists of Japan and the United States will 
be to the benefit of both nations and contribute 
to the development of the natural resources of 
China. Accordingly* Japan thinks it the best 
policy for the governments of the United States 
and Japan to encourage and pave the way for the 
cooperation of the capitalists of both nations.
If other nations make direct contracts with the 
Chinese government for such enterprises as rail­
ways or mining in South Manchuria and the eastern 
part of Inner Mongolia* sphere© of Japanese 
influence* Japan cannot overlook It* but the 
Japanese government will have no objections to 
the investment by Americans In these area© under 
contract with the Japanese.
2, Regarding the Unfair and Prejudicial ‘treat­
ment of Japanese in the United States*
Here* the instructions review the general situation 
and the relative power of the American Federal government 
to take action in opposition to state laws, The Issues 
upon which agreement must be reached to prevent the 
situation from becoming grave in the future are then 
listed*
a. The governments of the United States and Japan 
mutually give most-favored-nation treatment in 
acquisition* enjoyment* exercise* and Inheritance
36Ibld.
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of real property to the peoples of both nations.
b. Industry, trade and other vocations taken 
up by the peoples shall be based on mcst-favored- 
nation treatment.
0. Corporations and partnerships, whose 
employees and stockholders are wholly or partly 
composed either of Americans or Japanese, shall 
be given the same treatment in the acquisition, 
exercise, and enjoyment of their real property as 
other corporations and partnerships whose employees 
and stockholders are wholly or partly composed of 
the people of most-favored-nations.
d. This agreement shall have no effect on the 
existing laws.
e. The Japanese demand for the repeal.of the 
Land Law of California shall be .reserved.37
A brief recapitulation shows the intent of the authors 
of these instructions to Viscount Ishil. Japan wished to 
establish ^lasting friendship11 with the United States 
provided the United States practiced complete abstinence 
from political activity in China, and limited her inde­
pendent economic activity to areas not encroaching on 
Japanese special interests. It was clear that the special 
interests of Japan included the Shantung area, Manchuria, 
and Inner Eastern Mongolia. In these areas the United 
States was asked to submit to what amounted to Japanese 
management of American investments. Friendship between 
the two nations was also contingent upon American removal 
of prejudicial treatment toward Japanese living in the 
United States, and upon legally granting them the same
37Ibid.
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business and real estate privileges as were then granted to 
the most-favored-nat i on *
These Instructions, coupled with the more- general 
directives, leave little doubt that Japan was preparing 
to use the diversion caused by America's entry into the 
European War to remove the United States as an effective 
force from China,
To present these desiderata the Japanese government 
selected one of their most able and experienced diplomats, 
Kikujiro Ishil was fifty-one years old. He had graduated 
from the Law School of the Imperial University of Tokyo 
in 1890, and had been engaged in diplomatic activity 
almost continually since then. He had held various posts 
with the Japanese Legations in Paris, Minsen, and Peking! 
and had been First Secretary of the Foreign Office, Chief 
of the Telegraph Section and Director of the Commerce 
Bureau* In 1907 during the serious outbreak of anti- 
Japanese trouble along the West Coast of Canada, and the 
United States, he was sent to San Francisco and Vancouver 
to help settle the difficulty* He was made Vice Minister 
of Foreign Affairs in 1908* and during the same year 
started a tour as Ambassador to Paris, During 1915*1918 
he had acted as Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Okuma
2 8
governmen Baron In 1912, and was
The Terauchi government had selected one of Japan*a
most qualified diplomats to capry out the special mission, 
and had vested him with plcntipotentlal and extraordinary
On the 26 ch, three days prior to the mission*© depar­
ture, Motono sent Terauchi a letter for his approval to he 
sent from the Emperor to President Wilson* The letter, 
addressed to Yoshihito’s wD@ar Friend,” was a letter of
is quoted here in full as a remarkable example of a bygone
Oreat and Oood Friendt
Animated by the most lively feelings of satis­
faction at the entry of the United States
into the arena of war on the side of Justice, 1 
extend to you, and to the Nation over whose destines, 
under Providence, You preside, My sincerest wishes 
for the speedy victory of Our common cause.
Engaged Myself in the vindication of that cause, 
and in the battle against the inhuman submarine war­
fare waged upon the innocent, I have directed the
^During this period ha established a diplomatic dia­
logue with representatives of the Central Powers in Peiping 
and Stockholm.
^Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, The
one attachments better to President Wilson from Emperor 
Yoshihito, July 26, 19IT.
power
introduction and accreditation for the V i s c o u n t I t
age
Imperial Japanese Mission tothe United States, 1917 
XraiRXngtons Pres¥oF"Byron S V A ' J a m s T * pp. T-2.
^Forel&n Office. Letter from Motono to Terauchi with
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Viscount Xahii, My late Minister of State for 
Foreign Affairs, to proceed to Washington as My 
Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary at 
the head of a Special Mission charged to convey 
you My sentiments of congratulation upon the 
momentous and chivalrous decision taken by the 
United States, as well as My earnest wishes for 
the advancement of those relations of true friend­
ship between our two nations which are always very 
near my heart*
The knowledge which I have of the Viscount 
Ishil1s fidelity, his seal for My service, and his 
eminent talents, as well as of the other high 
personal qualities which in an especial degree 
distinguish him, convinces Me that he will accom­
plish to My entire satisfaction, the honourable 
and special mission which is entrusted to him, 
and that he will neglect nothing in order to 
merit Your confidence and esteem*
I therefore request that You will give full 
credence to whatever he shall communicate to You 
in My name, more especially, when he shall express 
to You My constant wishes for Your happiness and 
for the prosperity of Your country, and shall assure 
You of the profound esteem and invariable attachment 
with which I am,
Great and Good friend
Your sincere friend,
Sign Manualt
Imperial palace, Toklo,
the twenty-sixth day of the seventh month 
of the sixth year of Taisho* 1
With this, all preparations for the mission were com­
pleted* At 12:32 P*M* on Sunday the 29th of July, the 
Ishil Mission departed Tokyo Station for Yokohama and the 
TIOC steamer Korea Maru. The mission was seen off by a 
host of notables Including Admiral Count Togo, Count 
Terauchi, Baron Goto, Admiral Kato, General Oshima,
41Ibid
Viscount Motono and the American Charge d1 Affairs Mr* Poet 
Wheeler* At 3*00 P.M*, amid streams of multicolored tape, 
the mission steamed on its way for Honolulu.**2
Japan Tims a, July 39, 1917.
CHAPTER III 
OH TO WASHINGTON- AUGUST, 1917
On August 6, 1917# at lliOO A.M., Ishil and hi© party 
arrived in Honolulu, and received, in the words of The 
Japan Times, a "genuine o v a t i o n . T h e  territory of 
Hawaii reportedly received official United States instruc­
tions to accord the Ishil Mission the "treatment due to a 
state guest."2 Evidently, Governor Bingham and the resi­
dents far exceeded the requirements of these instructions. 
Ishii1© speeches and hi© activities while in Hawaii were 
given wide coverage and extremely favorable comment in 
the Pacific Commercial Advertiser and the Honolulu Star- 
Bulletin*^
Consul Morol of Honolulu was so pleased at the 
reception given Ishii that he forwarded a seven-page 
report to Foreign Minister Motono in which he especially 
stressed the value of the trip to the Japanese residents 
of Hawaii.** While in Honolulu the Viscount and party
*The Japan Times, August 8, 1917.
2Ibld., August 1, 1917.
^Foreign Office, Letter, Consul Morol (Honolulu) to
Motono, AugustI6, I917 (received September 3j 1917}*
h
Foreign Offloe, Itinerary of Viscount Ishil, undated.
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stayed at the Young Hotel;® they were given the thrill of
visiting the historic Huuanu Fall before the hasty eon-
&tlnuatlon of the trip on August 7th*
On August 13# 1917# the lorea Man* arrived off San 
Francisco* Traveling In a United States Navy launch* an 
official welcoming party went out to meet the mission.
This party consisted of Mr. Breekingridge-Long, Assistant 
Secretary of State; Mr. Calvin McNap, leader of the Demo­
cratic party in California and Chairman of the San Fran­
cisco Reception Committee; former Consul to Seoul, Mr. 
Miller; United States Navy Captain March; United States 
Army Colonel Iron; and other local military officials plus 
British Consul Boss and Japanese Consul Uehara.^
Upon the mission*s arrival, they war© taken t© a 
"monster reception” at City Hall where the reaction of
p>
the people was spontaneous and sincere. The party was
housed at the Saint Frmnci® Hotel.9
%ha Young Hotel is still in operation in Honolulu, 
but the habitat of less distinguished visitors.
aForeign Office» Itinerary of Viscount Ishil, undated. 
^Foreign Office, Letter, Uehara to Motono, August 17,
1917,
Q
The Japan Times, August 15, 1917#
^Foreign Office, Letter* Uehara to Motono, August 17,
1917*
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On the evening of the 14 th, Ishil gave a speech to a
gathering of 600 local citizens at the Grand Hotel, the
first of numerous speeches he made throughout his stay
in the United States. A quotation from a speech given
at a banquet staged by the citizens of San Francisco on
the evening of the 15th ie typical of the type of speech
made by Ishil, as he crossed the United State®. But he
did vary this theme later when he Introduced the Monroe-
Doetrine-in-Asia idea*
My mission is a mission of peace and good will*
I have come here at this very important time in 
order to confer on some important problems of 
common interest to Japan and America* It may be 
said that I have com© as an ally, in that I have 
brought to your, shores the guarantee that the 
Japanese people will closely co-operate with your 
country in this great war. Your country Is on 
the side of Justice and right, and th© welcome 
extended to the Japanese special mission indicates 
that Japan and America are friends with each other 
in peace and trade, and also means that their 
interests and their civilisation are common and 
equal. Your country has shown to the world that 
America prefers humanity to love, to happiness, 
to wishes, even to the extent of the sacrifice 
of lives.*0
One interesting aspect of the official reporting by 
both Japanese counselor officials of Honolulu and San 
Francisco was their obvious amazement at the intensity, 
spontaneity, and general nature of the welcome given 
Ishli. Morol In Honolulu was extremely impressed as
•^ The Japan Times, August 18, 1917*
3^
was Uehara in San Francisco* Uehara pointed out that the
numerous guest lists were well planned (a compliment to
Mr. McNap), and all segments of the society including
workingmen1a representatives were present at the official
functions, Uehara summed up his impressions by reporting
to Motono that the welcome would surely help kindle better
American*Japanese relations * *^
After four days of magnificent receptions by the city
of San Francisco, the Ishii Mission left by special train 
12for Yosemite. The group departed Stockton, California, 
at dawn, on the 18th of August for Washington, B.C., which 
they reached on the 22nd*
After their arrival in Washington, the members of 
the mission embarked on a demanding schedule of official 
functions Including formal presentation of the Viscount’s 
credentials on August 23rd to President Wilson, dinners, 
speeches, wreath*laying, and tours**-3
In Ishilfs own account of the trip and negotiations, 
Diplomatic Commentaries, he wrote at length about his first 
conversation with President Wilson* Ishil said that the
Foreign Office, Counsel Uehara to Motono, August IT, 
1917 (received September 11, 1917).
^Bobert Lansing, War Memoirs of Robert Lansing 
(Indianapolis and New York: The' s*MerrilX Company,
1935)0 P. £90.
13Ibld.
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President introduced the subject of China, and indicated
that American desires for that area encompassed only the
nfaithful observance , , . of the open door and equal
14opportunity principles/1 Wilson further stated,
according to Ishii, that the introduction of spheres of
Influence by various powers was disturbing him, and that
these spheres were interfering with the complete attain-
ISmerit of the mentioned principles. ^
Ishil, relieved apparently that Wilson had brought 
up the subject of China first, quickly pointed out that 
the spheres had been introduced by Germany and .Russia, 
and that Japan ”. * * has never failed to uphold in it 
spherg7 the principles of the open door and equal
*1 g
opportunity *M '
With that exchange the meeting was concluded except 
for an invitation to Ishii on the part of Wilson to carry 
on these conversations with the Secretary of State
Ishii, so he states* returned to his hotel and sent 
a cable to Tokyo recommending that the Torauchi government 
agree to the abolition of spheres of Influence for the
^likuiiro Ishii, Diplomatic Commentaries, translator 
W. Langdon (Baltimore* TPheT'oHns Hopkins ftrei'a, 193^), 
p. 112,
iSlshll, op. cit., p, 112.
l6Ibld., p. 113.
x7ibid.
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obvious reasons that Japan could raalce creator progress
commercially- in China than any of her European or American
competitors primarily due to the factors of inexpensive
labor and location* Thus* Japan stood to gain rather
10than lose if the spheres were renounced*
Ishil did. not hear from the Japanese government on
his proposal as the question had been turned over to the
Foreign Affairs Investigation Council and received a
generally hostile reception* He eventually tired of
waiting and prepared to open discussions with Lansing
on his own Initiative*^
Before beginning a description of the negotiations
between Lansing and Ishil, we must pause for a moment to
consider one further issue that was of great interest to
Ishii and the Japanese generally, that of the steel/iron
embargo* Mo reference to this problem was made in Ishii*s
personal instructions; however, the naval representative*
Vice Admiral Takeshita, had received general instructions
to look into the problem.* It must be introduced here as
much of Ishil9s preliminary talks were related to the 
20embargo*
l8n i a „  pp. 113-115.
•Olbld.. P. 115.
The matter of the iron/steel embargo hit the Japanese 
with great impact* During the month of August, the Japan 
Times devoted an unusually high degree of coverage to the
37
Arrangements had been made for the United States to
complete shipment of half of the 400,000 tons of steel on
order when the embargo took effect* It was up to Ishii to
obtain release of the remaining 200,000 tons and make
PIarrangements for the future.** In regard to this matter,
Ishii dispatched two messages from Washington prior to
his first business meeting with Lansing*
In a cable received by the Oalmusho on August 27,
Ishii reviewed the attitudes of the American public toward
22the special mission. He evidently believed that the 
general consensus was that the mission had been sent to 
satisfy the “selfish interests of J a p a n * He thought
problem, some of which tended on emotionalism* Generally, 
the Issue revolved around the fact that Japanese consumption 
of Imported iron was projected at 600,000 tons for 1917* 
{From the Japanese language newspaper Yorodzu***translation 
of the article appeared in the Japan Time a1''''on August 26, 
1917*) It was reported that JapanTs capability to produce 
Iron without drawing on American resources would be a 
meager 30,000 tons. Against this, the desire to use 
1/SOth of America's reported annual production of 40,000,000 
tons appeared to the Japanese as no serious drain* The 
American objectives of the ban were reported to bes 1.
Stop fluctuations in the steel market; 2* Stop Japanese 
shipments beneficial to the mmmy; 3* Encourage Japanese 
shipping available in the Atlantic to aid the Allies;
4. Fear of Japan winning a fins position in the marine 
world If further exports are allowed; 5* A United States 
attempt to check the prosperity of Japan. {Primarily 
from the Japan Times, August 26, 1917*)
21The Japan Timas, August 23, 1917.
Op
Foreign Office, Cable 315# Sato to Motono, August 27#
1917*
23Ibid.
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that, with such mistrust, it would be better to start 
negotiations on a problem mutually profitable for all 
sides. Such a problem was the steel embargo question.
Once negotiations had started he would wait for an appro­
priate time to introduce the question of China and the 
position of Japanese immigrants in the United States.2^
Having decided that this would be his course of action, 
he realized the determination of the United States not to 
export steel plates for shipping except in support of the 
war effort# In a message to Motono, received in Tokyo on 
the 30th, Ishii stated that the term "war purposes" or 
"war effort" was not too clear, and that he would need a 
more explicit definition by the United States*2^ Ulti­
mately, he Insisted, the meaning of war purposes must be 
left up to Japan* He recommended that the embargoed 
materials be obtained under a "war purposes" clause and 
later used as necessary,' (A most interesting insight 
into Mr, Ishil1s concept of diplomacy,)
Start of the formal talks between Lansing and Ishii 
had been postponed due to the Secretary of State’s pre­
occupation with the preparation of a reply to a Papal
24ibia,
2^Foreign Office, Cable 322, Sato to Motono, Ishii 8, 
August 30># I9I7 (received).
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peace note.2^ Ishii, however, was quite occupied as he 
visited Arlington Cemetery to see the tomb of Dr. Stevens, 
a one time advisor to the Japanese Foreign Office,2^ 
addressed the Senate on August 3Gth2^ and the House of 
Representatives on September 5th3® and then had some 
quiet visits with the British Ambassador,3*
His speeches before both legislative bodies were well 
received. Before the Senate he stressed the selfless 
nature of Japan* s involvement in the war,32 and In the 
House he warned against intrigues aimed at sowing dis­
sension between Japan and America.33 For a man who 
^couldn’t speak too well” he was certainly leaving his 
mark and he was generally aiding his cause.
On the 3rd, the British Ambassador visited Ishii as he 
returned from his summer vacation.3^ He indicated that
27The Japan Times, September 4, 1917*
2eibld., September 2, 1917*
2% b i d ., September 5, 1917*
3Glbld., September 9, 1917*
3*Foreign Office, Cable 328, Sato to Motono, Ishii 9, 
September "6, T9W  Ireceived) .
S^Foreign Office, Iahii’s Speech Before the Senate, 
Film 4787 --------- ------- - ---- ------------------
^Foreign Office, Ishii*s Speech Before the House of 
Repre sent ali ve aZ "ffitlm 484 .
3^Foreign Office, Cable 328, Sato to Motono, Sep­
tember 6, 9 (received).
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Britain was prepared to talk with the Americans on Japanese 
desires relating to the Pacific Islands and China as the 
British wished to do everything necessary to prevent a 
Japanese-American rift. Ambassador Spring-Rice said that 
the Japanese position with respect to these matters was 
correct. He was of the opinion that the United States 
had no vital interests at stake on these subjects, 
especially those relating to China.^
The British Ambassador cautioned Ishil that he may 
run into trouble with Lansing over the China question as 
the American Secretary was related to John Foster, a man 
greatly interested in China* Sprlng-Rice advised the 
special envoy to be persistent in these areas since non- 
recognition by the United States of Japanese Interest© may 
only be Lansing*s personal bias.36
Ishil inquired if the American government was aware of 
the Telnsien and Stockholm peace talks between Japan and 
the Central powers* Spring-Rice assured him that they were 
and that he had received all the accounts of this matter 
from the United States government and none from London*^
On the 5th, the day prior to the first formal talks 
between Lansing and Ishil, the special ambassador once
35Ibld.
36Ibld.
37Ibld.
again met with the British Ambassador*^ At this meeting 
the two discussed China and the possibility of pushing for 
American recognition of a Japanese Monroe Doctrine over 
China. The British envoy did not believe that the American 
government could go that far. Official cognisance of the 
Japanese position In China may be gained, but he did not 
think it possible that the Wilson Administration would 
publicly admit a Japanese Monroe Doctrine for China. The 
British Ambassador did state that his government was trying 
to explain the Japanese position to the Americans*39
Armed with this confidential advice, the Japanese
special envoy met the next day in Foggy Bottom with Robert
Lansing. During the first part of the two-hour session
questions of Japanese participation In the war and possible
ways of more complete cooperation with the Allies and the
*IQUnited States were discussed. Lansing suggested that 
Japan could possibly supply more ships for commercial 
purposes. As Ishii had Intended to discuss the iron and 
steel embargo problem initially and move on to the China 
question, Lansing*s first comments fitted conveniently Into 
the Viscount*s preconference plans.
^Foreign Office, Cable 332, Sato to Motono, Sep­
tember B , T ^ jL?, IshlI 10 (received).
39Xteid.
°Lansing, op. olt.. p. 290.
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Ishil related the entire question of shipping to the 
United States embargo by saying that Japan*s ship building 
program was restricted because of the embargo* Lansing in 
his account of the meeting records that the subject was 
reviewed in detail by the two. An understanding was 
reached that some-kind-of system would be appropriate 
which would incorporate steel shipments to Japan in 
exchange for the use of Japanese merchant ships by the 
Allies.41
In a supplementary report submitted by Ishil to the 
Terauchi government, and received in Tokyo on September 9* 
1917, Ishil pointed out that Lansing inquired whether the 
Japanese government contemplated sending troops to Europe. 
Ishil stated in the report that he had replied in the 
negative and that Lansing had responded by indicating 
agreement or understanding, and finally that the American 
had said Japanese troops in Europe might seem a bit strange. ^
As the day*s conversations progressed, Ishii stated 
that ”it would be unfortunate not to consider some of the 
other questions as we had to look forward to a time when 
the war would toe over.11^  Ishii then told Lansing of
4 libia.
^ F oreign Office. Cable 336, Sato to Motono, Sep-
tember tF,‘19it, fshll 13 (received).
^Lansing, op# clt., p. 291.
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Germany1s peace feelers of 1916* He mentioned that the
Germans had approached Japan three times In an effort to
44draitf It away from the Allied camp*
Lansing, certainly with tongue in cheek replied 
1 * * * that it was a matter of no concern to this govern­
ment, in view of the fact that Japan1s loyalty to an ally 
and her reputation for good faith was too well established 
to be ever suspected.
The special envoy also informed the American Secre­
tary of the Japanese talks with the British,^ and the 
fact that Sir Edward Grey had apparently approved the 
Japanese retaining the Pacific Islands north of the 
Equator.^ Ishil commented that returning these islands 
to Germany after the war would be against the Interests 
of humanity.'
Lansing replied, “Yea, that*s r i g h t . H o w e v e r ,  he 
was noncommittal as to who should get them.
44Ibid.
ft5jbid.
Foreign Office, Cable 333# Sato to Motono, Sep­
tember 8,1 19I?ff shlT 11 (received).
^Lansing, op. cit., p. 291.
^Foreign Office, Cable 333# Sato to Motono, Sep­
tember B 7 W , T s H I T  11 (received).
49Ibid.
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The two diplomats turned their attention to a con­
sideration of China; this subject was to occupy most of 
their conference hours until negotiations ended. In light 
of the propaganda accusing Japan of inactivity in the 
European war and great activity at the expense of China, 
Lansing proposed a joint declaration* Such a manifesto 
would stress the two governments1 respect for the terri­
torial Integrity of China as well as the principles of the
50open door and equal opportunities*
Lansing described Ishii as " taken back” by the 
suggestion*"^1 A term possibly more close to Ishii*s true 
reaction might be exasperated* The Japanese envoy replied 
that such a declaration already existed, specifically the 
Root-Takahlra Agreement of 1908. A restatement of these 
Ideas was to Ishii*s thinking valueless and could be 
misinterpreted by the Japanese people as a manifestation 
of America*s mistrust of Japan* He stated that ”* * .my 
government must avoid creating any such misunderstanding 
among the Japanese people. I cannot persuade myself, 
therefore, that a joint American-Japanese declaration 
such as you have suggested is appropriate at this 
time . . . »52
^Ishil, 0£. clt *, p. 116.
51^ Lansing, op* cit.* p. 291*
52lahii, 0£. cit*, pp. 116-117*
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He could have added, but did not, that such a decla­
ration did not satisfy his instructions* The Viscount 
went on to state that a Joint declaration must contain 
^something new and different** to make It significant * He 
proposed that the old agreement of 1908 be reaffirmed, but 
that a "statement defining Japan’s relationship to China 
• • • be added to it to allay misinterpretation by the 
Japanese people,H53 The definition of Japan’s rela­
tionship t© Ovtna, Iahll suggested, could be based on a 
recognition of Japanese Interest In China which is quite 
similar to that of the United States in Central America, 
as manifested in the Monroe Doctrine*^
Ishll pointed out that Japan’s special interests in 
China arose from "the arrangements of Mature" and need 
not be recognized by the various states; however, these 
Interests had been made a matter of record in the Anglo- 
Japanese Treaty of Alliance, the Franco-Japanese con­
vention and the Busso-Japanese agreements* Ishii explained 
that "under certain circumstances ***** such recognition
could be beneficial*55
At this point, as recounted in the Xshil memoirs,
Lansing stated that the discussion had "unexpectedly
53Ibld.. p. 117.
* w
5!W
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assumed a very serious aspect11 and he (Lansing) asked that 
the meeting be adjourned to allow time to study the 
proposal
In Ishli* s official communique to the Foreign Office, 
a slightly different account is available. He reports that 
after a slight hesitation Lansing said that "the American 
government understands Japan* s position in China, but the 
American people would not. He further advised that the 
United States could only point out Japan*a geographical 
position In a declaration. At this time Lansing suggested 
that consideration of the matter be postponed till the 
next meeting which was scheduled for Monday the 10th of 
September.^
In the Lansing version of the first meeting, we 
observe a somewhat more dynamic and aggressive Secretary 
of State* Rather than asking for adjournment of the 
meeting after presentation of Ishii* s proposal, Lansing 
replied that as Japan* s Interests were a direct result of 
her geographical position, the sources of her interests 
were natural and not political. Lansing Insisted that 
such a declaration would not be germane to a reaffirmation
56Ibid.
^Foreign Office, Cable 333, Sato to Mot one, Sep-* 
teraber B,T§Tf,'' Ishii 11 (received).
e-Q
^ Ibid.
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of the open door and that It might be miainterpreted as
referring to primarily political interests.
Lansing pressed his rebuttal by pointing out the
advantages Japan had by recognising the open door as
opposed to the older system of spheres of influence.
Japan, by complete adherence to the open door, would
have great commercial advantages in China due to her
geographical location and cheap labor* Lansing stressed
that a return to the spheres of Influence after the war
would restrict Japan far more than free commercial
competition* He then ended the first session stating
that he hoped Ishii would be willing to discuss the
Soproposal further at the next meeting.
The reasons for the omissions and slight differ­
ences in emphasis can be attributed to the fact that 
both individuals wrote their accounts some years after 
the negotiations, were writing for native consumption, 
and in defense of their own positions* Rather than 
stress these differences in partisan text, I will try 
to add, where possible, to their accounts to give a 
somewhat clearer picture of the negotiations than is 
provided by either of the two principals.
^Lansing, op* cit., p* 292. 
^°Ibld.
On September 8th, two days after initial discussions 
with Lansing, Ishii once again visited the British Ambas­
sador who appeared more and more to be Ishiifs primary 
foreign confidant and advisor. During this meeting the 
two discussed the attitude which the American government 
would take concerning the mission* Ambassador Spring-Biee 
held quite strongly that the United States would take 
China's side on negotiations* He said the Chinese were 
quite wary of Japanese ambitions on the mainland, and
61would be distraught at any Japanese conference success* x
Ishii explained that he would push for the abolition 
of spheres of Influence. He thought it not difficult for 
Japan to adhere to the open door as in free competition 
she could develop commercial preeminence in the area#®**
To this plan the British Ambassador was none too 
receptive* H© remarked that repudiation of the spheres 
might be good for Japan, but not necessarily for Britain. 
He sighted specifically some railroad concessions held 
by British nationals in the Yangtze Eiver area as reason 
for probable British nonconcurrence ^
61^Foreign Office, Cable 334, Sato to Motono, Sep­
tember ,"Tahii 12 (received).
6aIbid.
M«*For©i.jgn Office # Cable 339, Sato to Motono, Sep­
tember W,~1§X77 1 sKl'i 14 (received).
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The two diplomats once again discussed the problem of
Japanese ownership of the German Island© in the Pacific
north of the equator. Evidently, Ishii had been quite
optimistic on this point, but he began to have reservation®
as a result of the day1® conversation®• Sprlng-Kice
explained that there was "still some difficulty” on this 
64matter.
On the 10th of September Ishii met Lansing for the 
second time. In the published accounts of the negotia* 
tions, the tenth I© written off as a day when "nothing 
»*.■ occurred I ^  nouever, «ver.I venr lnt.re.tlns I t . ™
need to be recorded. Lansing, in Ishii*& report to Motono, 
said that he was still "in the thinking stage11 on a joint 
statement concerning China and the open door. Ishii said 
that as no instruction© had been received from Tokyo, he 
also wished to defer till later conversation on that 
particular issue. The two wont on to a discussion of 
a request for Chines© troops for the European war, forms 
of financial assistance to China, and the Bryan*Chinda 
Agreement.
^Foreign Office, Cable 334, Sato to Motono, Sep­
tember $»' Ishii'J 12 (received).
^$Lansing, op. cit., p. 293.
Foreign Office, Cable (unnumbered), Sato to Motono, 
September""12, XSOT"Ishii l6 (received).
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Ishii showed some obvious interest in Lansingfs remark 
that the Chinese had been asked to send, troops to Europe.
He eousiiented that the sending of large numbers of troops 
would impose a logistics problem and the dispatch of a 
few would be valuable for morale purposes only. Ho 
stated that engineers, light and heavy infantry would be 
of value.^
The conversation turned to a consideration of various 
ways to assist China financially* bansing said that the 
Onlted States would "gladly11 give loans to China*^® He 
mentioned that China had asked that payment of the Boxer 
Indemnity be postponed and that the current Import tax be 
Increased. The American Secretary of State indicated that 
the United States Intended to recommend that these requests 
be followed.
Ishii replied that he would need Instructions from
Tokyo to comment meaningfully on the loan matter, but he
would say that the request for an Increase in the Chinese
Import tax would be favorably considered by the Japanese
government even though it would be an Imposition on
70Japanese civil enterprise.
67Xbld.
68Ibid.
69Ibid.
' Ibid.
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The meat significant point of the September 10th 
talks was then brought up by Ishii, and it concerned the 
treatment of Japanese living in America. Ishii stated 
that he thought the time was appropriate for recon­
sideration of disclosing the terms of the Bryan-Chinda 
Agreement* This convention, evidently aimed at preventing 
or Inhibiting anti-Japanese legislation In the various 
states, had been agreed to by Wilson, but never released 
to the public. Lansing stated that he was aware of the 
agreement, but wanted time to research the matter and 
reply. With that, the second meeting came to an end.^l
710n the matter of the Bryan-Chlnda Agreement, I must 
point out that my research, to date, has failed to yield a 
text or a concrete subject. X was able to determine that 
in January, 1913, the 40th Session of the California Legis­
lature had prepared thirty-three separate bills or regu­
lations restrictive to Japanese residents in California.
The California State Attorney General, a man by the name 
of Webb, consolidated these proposals into one bill which 
became known as the Webb Bill. Ambassador Chinda received 
instructions from the Japanese Foreign Office to meet with 
Bryan (then Secretary of State), and to register Japan1s 
concern. This occurred In April, 1913* As a result of 
the conversations, President Wilson sent a telegram to 
Governor Johnson of Californla requesting his assistance. 
The California governor promptly took a state*s rights 
stand, replying that land laws were state matters and 
not the responsibility of the federal government. Bryan 
was sent to California to stop passage of the bill, but 
did not succeed as with only minor amendments it passed 
both houses and became law on August 10, 1913* All 
evidence points to an accord of some kind between Secre­
tary of State Bryan and Ambassador Chinda, but I cannot 
be any more specific as of this date. Zaldan Hojin Kikoku 
Hyakunen Kinen Bunka Jin Yo iCai, fflchlbe Bunka Koshoshl 
(Tokyo, Japan; Yoyosha, 1964/65)'T pp*rT 4 1 4 ’6.
A heartening indication of the success of the mission 
was seen in an article of the Washington Post* On Sep­
tember* 10th, the paper editorially took the position that 
Japan should be exempted from the steel embargo. The 
matter was highlighted in the Tokyo press as it was 
reported that the post had been until recently anti- 
Japanese.*^
Tokyo*s keen interest in the question of the steel 
embargo was reiterated to the special envoy in a massage 
dispatched on September 12th from Motono* The Japanese 
Foreign Minister stated that ff. . • Japan has a vital 
interest in its outcome, ** and prompted ishii to keep 
Tokyo informed by forwarding results of the conversations 
as they occurred.*^
The urgency of this matter to the Japanese is further 
indicated in a recapitulation of Ishii*s activities pre­
pared by the Japanese Embassy and forwarded to Tokyo on 
September 15th* In this summary it was reported that 
American officials were hinting that the United States 
was contemplating cutting all needless expenditures to 
save economic resources and shipping for the war effort.
7%he Japan Times, September 14, 191?*
^Foreign Office, Cable 302, Motono to Sato, Sep- 
tember I ^ 7 T | i r r WT s h l i 3 (sent).
The Japanese diplomats were quick to pick up tlw implication
that Imports of raw silk and silk px'oduets might be stopped*
To avert this economic calamity* Sato t ocommended that
japan "decide to let the United States use presently owned
*7 It
Japanese ships’* to prosecute the war*2
On the 12th* Ishii had visited the Shipping Depart­
ment* and had been briefed on United States steel plate 
production * ^  He was informed that the recently expanded 
United States production capability would be 2,6 million 
tons per annum* Ishii reported to Tokyo that this figure 
conflicted with the one of 3*5 million tons obtained by 
a Japanese shipping agent in New York* Ishii as iced the 
President of United States Steel Corporation* Elbert H.
Gary, to explain the discrepancy* Gary identified the 
3*5 million figure as only wa dream without any fact*H^
It was about this time that the Japanese realised 
that although tonsing had talked freely on the embargo 
problem* he did not have authority to make a decision on 
the matter. The Japanese Embassy* through Ambassador Sato* 
called upon the Export Committee and Shipping Department
^Foreign Office* Sato to Motorio, Recapitulation of 
Vi sc ouriFT Qhii * 5' le'H vi t lea* Compiled Seple®eF*T57^9T7«
^Foreign Office* Cable 36fo* Sato to Mo tone* Sep­
ta mber 2'3* 1917'*’ TsKIl 21 (rece 1 vad) .
7hbld.
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which evidently did have responsibility for determining
embargoed items^
Sato9a preliminary talks yielded wishful thinking in
the vein, that if the United States shipbuilding program
were cut back* the savings In steel plate could be sent to 
78Japan* In a report of this meeting Sato reiterated
American determination on this issue, and stated that it
“will be difficult to establish private contacts" with
them* The Ambassador emphasised the need to share
presently-owned vessels in the face of the United States
desire to cut expenditures as imports of Japanese silk
could be at stake. He concluded with a plea to Tokyo to
stop sending so many messages and appeals concerning the
yo
embargo as "they show our desperation*Wf^
Ishii spent the period from the 15th to the 21st of
September giving speeches in Philadelphia, Newport, Boston 
and Washington. He addressed, among others, the Chamber 
of Commerce and the American Academy of Political Science 
in Philadelphia, the Massachusetts Legislature and Boston
^Foreign office, Cable 3^3# Sato to Motono, Sep­
tember 1 f>, i^77"~£s5Ii 18 (received).
78Ibld.
79Ibid. At this point we will ceaae to follow the
BmbargoHFroblem as it has become a matter to be dealt
with by Ambassador Sato and his staff. It no longer 
receives Ishii * s attention.
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City Club in Boston, and the National press Club In Wash­
ington, D.C.^®
While Ishii was occupied with his short speaking tour 
to East Coast cities, result® of talks between the Japa­
nese naval member of the mission, Vice Admiral Takeshita, 
and the American Chief of Naval Operations were cabled to 
Tokyo* Takeshita reported that in a meeting on the 8th 
of September, the Americans had revealed certain planned 
changes In. the disposition of their naval forces* The 
cruisers Saratoga, Galveston and Cincinnati were to be 
transferred from the Philippines area to the Atlantic, 
and five destroyers were already on their way to the 
Atlantic from the Philippine Station* The United States 
asked that these force alterations be offset by having two 
Japanese cruisers in the Philippines area and one in the 
vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands* United States patrol 
craft In the Pacific off the West Coast were considered 
adequate and augmentation was not requested.^1
The Assistant Naval Minister, Toehluchi, in a reply 
to Vice Admiral Takeshita stated that the Allies expected 
the Japanese Navy to do its utmost in the Pacific area*
Office, Itinerary of the Viscount Ishii,
^Foreign Office, Cable 1533# Assistant Naval 
Minister ^o^hluchi 'to Deputy Foreign Minister Hidehara, 
September 17, 1917 (received)*
Film.
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As It was Japanese policy to concentrate on Pacific prob­
lems, he asked Takeshita to get a clear plcjfcure of American 
intentions in this regard*®^
Tochiuchi replied to the request for augmentation of 
naval forces quite positively* The cruiser Tok^wa was 
being mad# available for Hawaii duty and the First 
Special Destroyer Squadron with the cruisers Yagurao,
Yaha&l and Yodo was to be placed on Philippine patrol*®® 
Whan Takeshita returned to inform the Chief of Naval 
Operations (CNO) of the latest Japanese offer, he was told 
that America appreciated the Japanese Navy1a kind gesture, 
but that only the Saratoga would need replacing* Evi­
dently the British had indicated a strong desire that 
American naval forces remain in the Manila area* This 
wish was acceded to by the United States* The CNO 
expressed the hope that in the North pacific tight 
security could be realised through close Japanese- 
American cooperation. The Americans informed the 
Japanese naval representative that they wished to talk 
further on this before his return home. The Japanese 
offer for ships for Philippine duty was held open.
Op
Foreign Office, Cable Unnumbered, Tochiuchi to 
Take sh lEa’,' unda?e
83Ibid.
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Takeshita indicated that it was up to the Americans if
84they were to be used or not,
On the 22nd of September at 3?00 In the afternoon, 
Ishii met Lansing for their third working meeting*®-**
Ishii stated that his government did not 'want to get 
Involved in any action that might upset the status quo 
in China#®® The possibility of an agreement on the 
spheres of influence thus became remote•
Lansing then asked about & declaration on the open 
door to which Ishii replied that he could mate no such 
statement unless it recognised In some manner Japanese 
special Interests* The American Secretary of State 
stated that the United States would recognize Japan's 
economic interests, but that paramount Interest and the 
open door policy were mutually exclusive ideas.
Ishii replied that the Japanese government did not 
have any particular awareness cf the word paramount* He 
thought that the United States itself had paramount
^Foreign Office, Cable 3, Japanese Naval Attach© to
Naval Mini a try, September 22, 1917; and Undated letter from
Acting Secretary of Navy (F* D. Hoosevelt) to Lansing, 
0P-9-B*
^Lansing* og>* cit*, pp* 293-^94.
®®Foreign Office, Cable 361, Sato to Motono, Sep­
tember 35*_iy i?7 tshli 22 (received).
87m d .
53
interests in Mexico* and that the open door policy did not 
seem to conflict with paramount Interests there
"The United States does have special interests* hut 
doesn’t demand paramount interests*1 argued the Secretary.^ 
"if you don’t like paramount interest" Ishii replied* 
"we can use special interest as an alternative."^0
Ishii* according to Cable 331, then defined what he 
meant by special Interest. As this is particularly critical 
to later developments* hi® remarks are quoted practically 
verbatim.
Japan will be satisfied with the recognition of 
Japanese special interests in China, if not 
preeminent Interests. However, in order to avoid 
misunderstandings, I should like to explain the 
meaning of special Interests. A civil war or 
collapse In China may not have any direct effect 
on other nations, but to Japan, it will be a 
matter of life and death. A civil war in China 
will immediately be reflected in Japan, and the 
downfall of China means the ruin of Japan. On 
the above ground, Japan cannot rest reassured 
for her self-defense unless China is well gov­
erned in defense and public security. Japan 
thinks it her duty, therefore, to dispatch mili­
tary officers to keep peace and order In China 
within the limits set up by the necessity of 
maintaining the independence of China.91
88Ibid.
89Ibid.
9°Ibid.
9^Ibld. and Kamikawa, op. cit., p. 345. It certainly 
seems quite clear that Ishii is not making reference to 
economic special interests, and that he has defined Japa­
nese Interests In China bordering on a "right to Intervene" 
in order to maintain a government friendly to Japan.
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Lansing commented that the United States was not 
against other countries sending; advisors to South American 
countries* f,Als© In China, if that country needs advisors, 
not only Japan, Britain cr France, but even the United 
States should take part in this.w The Secretary indicated 
that in China the predominance of one country would stifle
QO
equal opportunity. *“
Xshli, evidently warming up by this time, replied
that the Chinese government did not have enough power to
govern, and that Japan1a relationship was one of life and
death. He then openly said to Lansing:
It seems you think Japan Is attempting to assume 
power In China; If you think this way, you don1! 
comprehend the Japanese position . * « Japan has 
always respected the expressed statement and the 
Implied spirit of treaties. Certainly It ^aparj7 
doesn1t give you any suspicion • . . .93
Lansing replied that he had always been deeply 
Impressed.with Japanese fidelity in international rela­
tions. He stated that he understood the Intention of the 
Japanese government and that he would draft a note which 
would Include a statement on Japanese special Interests, 
fh© Secretary indicated that he would obtain Presidential 
approval and then pass the note to Ishii.^
^Foreign Office, Cable 3^1, Sato to Motono, Sep­
tember 1^5*19i7'(received).
93Ibld.
94Ibld.
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Lansing concluded by stressing the need for solidarity 
between the United States and Japan* He said, ’*At this 
moment, to publish a declaration is important to make 
Germany realise that there is no room for Germany to 
alienate Japan from the United States*”95
Ishii replied, ”lf you complete a draft, 1*11 study 
it anytime gladly.
The Lansing account of this meeting, as recorded In 
his memoirs, again differs slightly from the Japanese. 
Lansing writes that Ishii suggested the redeclaration of 
the open door. In this conversation Lansing pointed out 
that the United States and Japan were the only two powers 
capable of taking advantage of the European war by acting 
In China* He stated that Japan and America must 1 dispel 
the Impression that vie would selfishly seek to take 
advantage of their European national wasted con­
dition . * **'97
Ishii in his reply, according to Lansing, pointed out 
that the Japanese public would hold the Terauchl government 
accountable for agreeing to a declaration which did not 
mention Japan's special interests.^
9&Ibid.
96Ibid.
^Lansilng, op. c i t., p. 29k.
^Ibld .
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Lansing's answer to this was categorical. If Ishii
meant by "special interests," paramount interests then the
matter would not be further discussed. However, if the
special interests referred to or could imply those
interests arising out of geographical position, Lansing
would consider a declaration.^ According to Lansing,
Ishii then asked him to prepare a draft declaration for
consideration.100
The Lansing memoirs state that at this meeting the
American Secretary tried to clear up the "misconception
of the underlying principle** of the Monro® Doctrine
That it was not an "assertion of primacy or of paramount
interest by the United States in relation to other American
republics; that its purpose was to prevent foreign powers
from interfering with the sovereign rights of any nation
102in this hemisphere*11
Ishii made no mention of this lecture in his official 
cables regarding the conference
In a second cable covering the events of the 22nd of 
September meeting, Ishii did report that Lansing still
"ibid.
100Ibld.
1Q1Ibld., p. 295.
102Ibid.
^O^Forelgn Office, Cable 372, Sato to Motono, Sep-
tember W7T^7T*TsHri 23 (received).
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.had not had sufficient time to research the Bryan^Chinda
Agreement, and that he had no comment on It* He also 
informed Tokyo that Lansing wanted him to stay in the 
United States "if at all possible" until a declaration 
could be decided upon#1^
This meeting on the 22nd seemed to qualify as one 
during which H. . . the conversations frequently became 
excited and lost their c o h e r e n c e a s  Ishii later wrote 
in his memoirs. Out of what must have been a rather 
lengthy and heated session came the agreement that a 
draft declaration would toe prepared toy Lansing, Little 
els# seems to have been accomplished save a rather com­
plete exchange of views on the open door, Japanese special 
interests in China, and the "true" meaning of the Monroe 
Doctrine, The lasting significance of the day's exchange 
on the two principals seems questionable since both, in 
recording their memories, chose to ignore practically 
all tout their own parochial arguments.
Keen Tokyo interest in the status of the Bryan- 
Chinda. Agreement was reflected in a cable from Motono 
dispatched on the 25th of September, In it, Motono
104Ibid.
10^l8hil# op. cit.. p. 122.
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asserted that realization of this agreement had been desired 
for many years by the Japanese government* He encouraged 
Ishii to "work hard for lt.*,a,c^
r
1 0 6 Of  flo e *  Cable 325# Motono to  Sato, 3ep-
tember 2 T T W ," ¥ o ~ T 5 h ll 6 ( s e n t).
CHAPTER IV
THE DRAFT
On the morning of the 26th of September, Ishii 
received a draft declaration from Lansing* It was for­
warded to Tokyo by cable and was received there on the 
28th.1
The following Is the text of the first draft:
I have the honour to communicate herein my 
understanding of the agreement reached by us in 
our recent conversation, touching questions of 
mutual Interest to our Governments relating to 
the Republic of China*
Charges have repeatedly been made of late, 
some accusing the United States, and others 
Japan, of seeking to take advantage of present 
world conditions to acquire political influence 
or control in China, The Governments of the 
United States and Japan, having always recognized 
China as a sovereign and independent state, and 
having repeatedly declared that they consider 
foreign interference In China1s domestic political 
affairs to be violative of Chinese sovereignty, 
.resent such accusation as offensive and as wholly 
unjustified.
In order to silence such mischievous report 
/slc7, however, it Is believed by us that public 
announcement once more of the desire© and inten­
tions shared by our two Governments with regard 
to China Is advisable*
The Governments of the United States and Japan 
recognize that territorial propinquity creates 
special relations between countries, and conse­
quently the United States Government recognize
^Foreign Office, Cable 377* Sato to Motone, Sep- 
tember SB, l§lf, Ishii 24 (received).
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that Japan has a special relation to China, par­
ticularly to that part to which her possessions 
are contiguous, for participation by the citizens 
or subjects of all nations having treaty relations 
with China, In the commerce and in the economic 
and industrial development of that country, and 
that they will not take advantage of present con­
ditions to seek special rights or privileges In 
China which would abridge rights of citizens or 
subjects of other friendly states. Moreover they 
mutually declare that they are opposed to acqui­
sition by any other Government of any special 
rights or privileges that would affect independence 
or territorial integrity of China, or that would 
deny, to the subjects or citizens of any country, 
full enjoyment of equality of opportunity in the 
commerce and industry. Territorial sovereignty 
of China, nevertheless, remains unimpaired, and 
the Government of the United States has every 
confidence in the repeated assurances of the 
Imperial Japanese Government that in enjoyment 
of such special rights, they have no desire to 
discriminate against the trade of other nations 
or to disregard commercial right heretofore granted 
by China in treaties with other powers.
The Governments of the United States and Japan 
deny that they have any purpose to Infringe in any 
way Independence or territorial integrity of China, 
and they declare furthermore that they earnestly 
desire faithful observance throughout all China of 
the principle of the so-called-open door or equality 
of opportunity of China.
They furthermox*© agree to bring this declaration 
to the attention of other interested Governments, 
and invite those Governments to give their adherence 
to these declarations.
I shall be glad to have Your Excellency confirm 
this understanding of the agreement reached by us*
(Signed)2
Ishii met Lansing on the afternoon of the 26th to 
discuss the draft that had been received that morning. At
^Foreign Office, Cable 377, Sato to Motono, Sap- 
tember"'""S87 l§lf, Ishii 24 (received).
66
this meeting the two negotiators agreed to make the fol­
lowing changes;
1* In paragraph two, they agreed to delete the 
words f,and having repeatedly declared that they consider 
foreign interference in China’s domestic political affairs 
to be violative of Chinese sovereignty.”
2. In paragraph four Ishii wanted to change, “Japan 
has a special relationM to “paramount" or "pre-eminent /Iic7 
Interest in," but Lansing did not agree. The two finally 
settled on "special interest in China."
3. Also in paragraph four, they changed the words 
"particularly to that" to "particularly in."
4. Finally in paragraph four the words between 
"Japanese government that” and "they have no desire" became 
"while geographical position gives them special Interests."
5. In paragraph five, the two agreed to substi­
tute "always adhere to principle of so-called open door or 
equal opportunity for commerce and industry In China" where 
"earnestly desired1' began. This particular sentence, used 
in the Root-Takahira Agreement, was Inserted at Ishii1a 
insistence as he felt If he didn,t, Tokyo would; Lansing 
agreed,^
Ishii reported that after agreeing on the listed 
changes, Lansing asked for a two hour recess In order to
2Foreign Office, Cable 361, Sato to Metono, Sep- 
tember“28, 1"?IT, Isliii 2% (received).
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obtain President Wilson's approval. After this recess the
negotiators met again, and Lansing informed the special
4ambassador that Wilson had approved the draft.
In the cable which forwarded these changes to Tokyo, 
Viscount Ishii made it pointedly clear what h® thought h© 
had achieved from the negotiations thus far. . this
proposal recognizes Japan's Monroe Doctrine toward China.
It is doubtful if the Monroe Doctrine has ever been 
defined strictly In economic terms. Certainly Ishii was 
not of the opinion that he was bargaining for United States 
recognition of Japan's economic preeminence In China. This 
fact, that Ishii was out for more than recognition of eco­
nomic interests, must have been patently clear to Lansing 
especially in light of the changes Ishii recommended to 
the draft. The deletion of the phrase "and having 
repeatedly declared that they consider foreign Inter­
ference In China's domestic political affairs to be 
violative of Chinese sovereignty,H and the change from 
"faithful observance throughout all China of the principle 
of the so-called open door" to the innocuous statement 
"always adhere to principle of so-called open door" must 
have indicated Ishii's Intent.
^Ibld. 
5Ibld.
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Ishii forwarded several additional dispatches to 
expand on the September 26th meeting with Lansing* He 
reported America*a willingness to lend up to ten million 
dollars to China; the fact that the Chinese intended to 
sand troops to Europej some background information on 
paragraph six of the draft declaration; and a few remarks 
on the term "special interests*"
With respect to the question of large loans to China,
the Japanese envoy inquired about Chinese intentions and
capability to repay* Lansing Indicated that the Chinese,
as a matter of principle, had the right to obtain loans
from the United States if they ordered military goods.
As to repayment, Lansing said that there was still certain
6room for negotiations.
Concerning Chinese troops in the European theater, 
Ishii showed considerable surprise at China1s determination 
to send troops to Europe In the face of north-south dis­
sension verging on civil war. He indicated that trans­
portation of the force to Europe would be the major 
problem and would be quite expensive. Lansing observed 
that If Japan furnished the ships it would be a real 
contribution to the war effort.^
^Foreign Office, Cable 383, Sato to Motono* Sep­
tember" £8,'u^l?, ishii 27 (received).
7Ibld.
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The rationale for paragraph six of the draft decla­
ration was also forwarded to Tokyo* Evidently, ProBident 
Wilson felt strongly about its inclusion. According to 
Ishil, Wilson was particularly interested In presenting a 
united front to Germany, and was concerned that a bilateral 
agreement between Japan and America be coordinated with the 
Allies, In this cable, Xshii stated that it might be 
appropriate for Japan1© special interests in China to be 
approved by all the Allied Powers. Lansing reportedly
a
agreed with this idea.
Ishil1s comments on the choice of the term "special 
interest” are Quite interesting. The Viscount explained 
In a brief cable that as Lansing would not agree to 
"paramount” or "pre-ejnenient* i&7 as the English to 
express Japan's relationship to China, the words "special 
interests" were chosen. Ishil thought that these words 
were vague and required soma-kind of explanation. In 
fact, Ishil held that the term seemed strange In diplo­
matic language.^
In his memoirs, Lansing write© at length, on the 
reason for his choice of "special interests." It seems 
he found the two words to contain less political overtones
o
Foreign Office, Cable 384, Sato to Motono, Sep- 
temberTSS,fel?» IsHli 28 (received).
9Foreign Office, Cable 385, Sato to Motono, Sep- 
tember 28, I§l7, IsHii 29 (received).
TO
than "paramount,* "pre-eminenttt or "special relations., ” 
and accordingly sought their inclusion. Lansing states 
that he made the Japanese special representative "fully 
understandthat the term related only to Japan* s geo­
graphical position and her commercial Interests
Obviously, Lansing was splitting semantic hairs and 
was not as fully understood as he thought. Xshii*b message 
makes this quite clear.
On this same day, the 26th of September, Xshii had a 
half-hour private talk with the President. Although he 
does not report to Tokyo on subjects discussed during 
this conversation, aside from the fact that he told Wilson 
he was going to New York,^3 we can gather from Ishil*s 
memoirs that this particular session was none too suc­
cessful. He mentions that Wilson was suspicious of Japan 
and imagined it was opposed to the open door and to 
equality of opportunity in China
10Lansing, oj>. cit., p. 296. 
n JMd.
^Foreign Office, Cable 385# Sato to Motono, Sep­
tember 26, 191?',' ’¥ sH 11 29 (received).
^ F o reign Office, Cable 3B2, Sato to Motono, Sep­
tember ^ 7T 9T?TTiHIi 26 (received).
^Ishil, op. cit., p. 118.
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On the 27th* Ishil left Washington for New York and
a series of public appearances and speeches. He sent the
Secretary of state a letter informing him of his departure
from the capital and thanking him for all the courtesies
16thus far extended*
During this seven day sojourn In Hew York* the repre­
sentative of Japan made at least seven speeches to a variety 
of audiences ranging from the Japan Society to the Hew York 
State Chamber of Commerce• The most notable of the 
speeches from a controversial point of view was the one
given on the 29th of September at the Waldorf Astoria 
18Hotel. The occasion was a dinner given in honor of 
Mr. Xshii by the mayor of Hew York, John Purroy Mttchel. 
Ishil spoke at length on Japan's position vis-a-vis China, 
This relationship as outlined by Ishil was interpreted in 
the p r e s s , ^  and Justifiably so, as the declaration of a 
Japanese Monroe Doctrine toward China. The Viscount in 
part said t
^Foreign Office* Cable 381, Sato to Motono, Sep- 
tember SB," I9I7V'''I'SKi'i 25 (received).
1
Foreign Office, letter, Ishil to Lansing, Sep­
tember 27, I9I7 # Slim 526.
^Foreign Office, Itinerary of Viscount Ishil* Film 
550 and 553.
l8Ibld.. Film 556.
^The Japan Times, October 6, 1917,
J2
. . , circumstanceb for which we were in no sense 
responsible gave us certain rights on Chinese 
territory but at no time In the past and at no 
time in the future do we* or will we* seek to 
take territory from China or to despoil China 
of the rights. We wish to be and to always 
continue to be the sincere friend and helper 
of our neighbor for we are more interested than 
anyone else except China in Good Government 
there* only we must at all times for self pro­
tection* prevent other nations from doing what 
we have no right to do. Hot only will we not 
seek to assail the Integrity or the sovereignty 
of China* but will we eventually be pre­
pared to defend and maintain the same Integrity 
and independence of China against any aggressor. 
For we know that our own landmarks would be 
threatened by any outside invasion or interference 
in China.20 {Italics mine.)
The speech is valuable as it sheds light on Ishil1s 
own interpretation of Japan's position in Asia. More 
important* however* the special ambassador probably used 
the speech as a means to determine the public temperament 
on the issue. The reaction was sufficiently keen so that 
two days later at a dinner at the St* Hegis Hotel* Ishil
pi
qualified and clarified his remarks.
. . .  I find that this utterance of mine is taken 
as the enunciation of a MMonroe in Asia*M 1 want 
to make It very clear to you that the application 
of the terra "Monroe Die trine " to this
policy and principle* voluntarilyoutlined and 
pledged by me is inaccurate.22
20Foreign Office* Viscount Ishii's Speech at the
Waldorf -Astoria'tfote!* September 29* 1917* Film 556*
^Foreign Office* Speech at St. Regis Hotel, Film 578.
22Ibid.
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The Viscount went on to point out that the policy
he had outlined bound Japan to observe certain voluntary
restrictions such as respect for China’s territorial
integrity* equality of opportunity and the open-door*
Japanese action in China,, he pointed out* would thus be
far more restricted than similar United States activity
21in the Americas.
Ishil stayed in Mew York until the 3rd of October
at which tiros h© departed for Atlantic City and a slight
respite from the demanding schedule of the past week.
On the 5th of October he returned to Washington and
stayed at the Willard Hotel
While Xshii was in Mew York* Vice Admiral Takeshlta
informed Tokyo that it had been decided* after consultation
with both Lansing and Ishil* to release a statement on
naval cooperation between Japan and the United States
at the same time that a diplomatic note was publicized. In
the pacific it was noted that agreement had been reached
between American naval official© and the Japanese naval
representatives who accompanied Ishli. One phase of the
25Ishil Mission apparently was concluding successfully. ^
g3f»oy©jgn Office. Viscount Ishil’s Itinerary* Film 553*
24Ibid.
2^ForelF,n Office. Cable 1670 (Secretariate), Assistant 
Naval Minister TocHTuchl to Assistant Foreign Minister 
Hidehara* September 29* 1917*
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The strain of the mission, was beginning bo be felt by
the Viscount because on October 3rd, he recommended that
the visit be concluded, lie reported that the American
people had formed a good impression, and he feared that
a further stay would only increase the risk of ruining
26achievements to date.
On October 7th, Ishil received Tokyo*m comments on the 
draft declaration. The Galmusho felt that the draft was 
generally acceptable, but recommended several significant 
changes, paragraph two which dealt with accusations against 
United States and Japanese opportunism in China was deleted 
from the Japanese counterdraft in its entirety. Motono 
stated that its inclusion would only result in criticism 
and misunderstanding and implied that detailed coverage in 
such a declaration would tend to give validity to the 
accusations. As It "dealt merely with fabrications,he 
recommended the paragraph be deleted and paragraph three 
changed to meet the requirements of the new text. In this 
relation, Motono thought that paragraph three should be 
changed to read, ,fIn order to silence mischievous reports
^Foreign Office, Cable 182, New York Counselor Yada 
to Foreign M i n i K S F H o t  on©, October 3# 1917# Ishli 31 
(received).
^Foreign Office, Cable 34?, Motono to Sato, October 6 
1917# ^"iSEiT 5 (sent),
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that have from timo to time been circulated it is
. *. , f|28bolvevei . . . .
The vjorda 1 special interests?! thaw gave Xshii such 
a time seem to have equally baffled the men at the Foreign 
Office, The cable from the Oaimusho stated: "This terra
is flexible as well as bound leas*11 In studying this term, 
Motono and his staff found it used in a British cable 
dated the 12th of January, but slightly expanded. The 
words "and influence*1 had been added. Accordingly, Tokyo 
recommended that "special interests and influence” would 
be more clearly understood without hurting the original 
meaning* It was requested that this item be brought to 
Xanaing’s attention.®®
Xshii was told to delete the phrase, also in para- 
graph four, "The territorial sovereignty nevertheless 
remains unimpaired*” This statement was held to be mis­
leading and casting an impression that japan Intended to 
infringe upon China’s territorial sovereignty# The Foreign 
Office considered that respect for China’s territorial 
integrity and independence would be covered adequately 
in draft paragraph five * 30
28Ibid.
g9jbid.
3°Ibld.
76
Two portions of paragraph four were cited as being 
indicative to a third party of '* some-kind-of argument 
between the United States and Japan,,f*^ and did not seem 
in keeping with the current good relations between Japan 
and the United States* Motono requested that the fol­
lowing phrasers in the fourth paragraph be deleted*
* . . and that they will not take advantage of
present conditions to seek special rights or 
privileges in China which would abridge rights 
of citi&ens or subjects of other friendly 
states * * « *
* * * they have no desire to discriminate against 
the trade of otter nations or to disregard commer­
cial right heretofore granted by China in treaties 
with other Powore*32
Hot only did Motono ask that these passages be deleted,
he reiterated his feelings fey saying that they should,
"definitely be deleted."*^
In regard to paragraph six, Motono instructed Ishli 
that 11 at least" the phrase "and invite those Governments 
to give their adherence to these declarations" should fee 
delated. He indicated that he was not completely happy 
with the first part of the paragraph as it might put some 
of the powers in a difficult position1 however, he would 
not object to its inclusion.^
31Ib ld .
3gIb ld .
33Ib ld .
Ibid.
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In reviewing the draft declaration, Motono stated 
that as compensation for making a statement on respect for 
Chinese territorial sovereignty, the open-door, equal 
opportunity, eb cetera, the United States should in turn 
admit Japanese special interests in China* The Japanese 
position as reflected in the latest changes, in Motono*s 
opinion, could not he compromised further* "This is the 
limit, so think of it that way" was the Foreign Minister* s 
advice to Ishil.^
Motono concluded his cable to ishil by reminding him 
of Japan*s existing agreements with Britain and Russia 
concerning Chinese policy. He pointed out that it would 
be proper to notify them privately before consummation of 
the United States-Japanese notes, Ishil was asked to 
pass this point along to Lansing.^
The Japanese special envoy met Lansing to discuss 
this latest dispatch on the 8th of October, In his report 
of the meeting Ishli said that the item concerning expan­
sion of "special interests1* to "special Interests and 
influence" and the request for deletion of the phrase 
"territorial sovereignty nevertheless remains unimpaired" 
had been submitted to Lansing, They were taken under
35Ibld.
36xbid.
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advisement by Lansing as lie wanted to have one day to 
tillnk the matter ovar,^
Ishil indicated that the “they will not take advan­
tage " clause of paragraph four caused him considerable 
anguish* He reported that he repeatedly explained the 
Japanese position to Lansing on this item and that finally 
the American Secretary agreed to think it over* It was 
Ishil#s candid opinion that Lansing would finally agree 
to its deletion*33
1*h@ unexpected intransigence on the part of Lansing 
and the Americans concerning some of the Japanese revisions 
was explained by Ishil as traceable to two major points*
From a private source, identified only as a Mr* Miller,
Ishil states that he learned that the original draft as 
proposed by Lansing had taken the State Department by 
complete surprise* Evidently, reported Ishil, State
Department officials had not expected Wilson and Lansing
39to go as far as they had*
Wilson was also extremely disappointed over the 
absence from the draft declaration of any reference to 
the problem of spheres of Influence in China* Ishli
^Foreign Office, Cable 422, Sato to Motono, October 10, 
1917* Ishli (received)*
38Ibid.
39ibid.
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stated that he and Lansing caae to the conclusion that 
Wilson did not congratulate the special envoy on the draft 
note whan the two met on September 26th, because of his 
unhappiness over this matter.
■Th.a Japanese Special Ambassador feared that because of 
the absence of a statement regarding abolition of spheres 
of influence, the entire declaration was endangered. He 
held that doubt as to Japan* s intentions would be created 
if recognition cf Japanese special interests were demanded, 
without agreeing to abolish spheres of influence.***
Ishil made one other Interesting point In this cable 
In relation to statements of respect for China1© terri­
torial Integrity* He did not necessarily agree with 
Tokyo's request to delete the statement on unimpaired 
territorial sovereignty* He astutely pointed out that 
Japanese recognition of Chinese territorial integrity 
could be "profitable in the future." "For instance,”
Ishli continued, "military and police functions are 
very important; however, they are not related to Chinese 
territorial integrity and are part of phases of protecting 
Japanese special interest©.” With great insight, Ishil 
observed that "• . . Lansing didn't say Chinese political
4oIbid.
41Ibid.
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independence, he said specifically Chinese territorial 
integrity.
To Ishil1s observations and suggestions, Tokyo 
replied in a message dispatched on the 10th that the 
revisions as previously suggested were carefully con­
ceived by the Japanese government and represented its 
position. He was encouraged to continue to try to obtain
i!
the desires a© detailed In the previous communication. J
In the Lansing account of the meeting on October 8th, 
one observes a slight divergency. Lansing indicates he 
rejected the addition of "and Influence*1 to the term 
uspecial Interests,According to Ishli, that occurred 
at a later date.
On the 10th, Lansing and Ishil met for another working 
meeting. Lansing informed Ishil that the deletion of para­
graphs two and six had been approved, as well as the change 
to paragraph three. However, the two changes requested in 
paragraph four dealing with opportunism and trade discrimi­
nation in China were held critical to the declaration, and 
the United States would not agree to their deletion. Ishil 
reported that the matter was even discussed In detail with
^3puxvlgn Office, b&blo Motono to ooto, October 10,
1917, To Ishli i'6 (sent).
^Lansing, ojg, cit ., p. 298,
8l
President Wilson, but to no apparent avail. "The American 
government," continued Ishil, "wants these points admitted 
by Japan.”45
At this session, Lansing asked that the "other" in 
paragraph four in the phrase beginning with "acquisition 
by any other” be deleted. Ishil apparently agreed with 
the suggestion, but stated in his report that It was diffi­
cult to determine Lansing1s rationale for the suggestion 
as the American Secretary did not give any obvious reasons.
The special envoy reported that on this matter, Lansing had
46made up his mind and was not inclined to change.
The two also discussed the matter of releasing the 
notes to allied powers. Lansing wanted to give a copy of 
the agreement to each allied country with a representative 
in the United States, and release It publicly the day 
after. Ishil commented to the Foreign Office that as 
England, France, Russia and China had representatives in 
Japan, they should probably be told. Both Lansing and 
Ishil agreed that distribution of these advanced notes 
should be based on the desires of both countries. ^
In the Lansing record of this day's session, one does 
not receive the impression of strong American opposition
^Foreign Office, Cable 427, Sato to Motono, October 10, 
1917, Ishil 5f (sent).
4 6 Ib ld .
^7Ibld.
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to deletion of the section dealing with opportunism*
Certainly the sense of urgency which is found in Ishii' s
cable concerning this phrase 1® absent from Lansing's
version. If they deleted this portion, Lansing stated,
the two powers would be missing a great opportunity to
48demonstrate their lack of self-interest. Ishli, 
according to the Lansing memoirs, Indicated his appre­
ciation of Lansing's logic, but intimated that the 
political situation in Japan dictated e x p e d i e n c y . * ^
Lansing countered with a minor quid pro quo, saying 
that If the section were deleted, the word "other” had 
better be removed from the next sentence to make the 
declaration more acceptable.*^
In summing up the exchange over this matter Lansing
said:
, * . while I would have liked to see the elimi­
nated phrase retained, I considered that to 
exchange it for the elimination of the word 
"other” was a good bargain.*1
It was Indeed a good bargain as the sentence without
"other” read, "Moreover they mutually declare that they
are opposed to acquisition by any /other/ Government of
**®Lanslng, op. elt., p. 299.
49lbld.
5QIbld.
p, 300.
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any special rights or privileges that would affect inde-
co
pendence or territorial Integrity of China, - * .
This change would have seriously restricted Japan's 
position vis-a-vis the gains made as a result of the 
Twenty-one Demands of 1915* and might have put similar 
restriction on Japan's post-war plans.
Further instructions for the Viscount were cabled 
from Tokyo on the 12th of October. Motono stated that 
"by all means1 Ishii should seek the deletion of the 
section beginning "and that they will not take advan­
tage." He also Instructed Ishii that it was alright 
to agree to Lansing's strong desire to delete the word
Mother" from the phrase "acquisition by any other 
53government.,f
On the 12th of October, in Washington, the two 
negotiators met again. This meeting, according to Ishil, 
was specifically devoted to discussions of the two items 
Introduced by the Japanese representative on the 10th, 
namely the possibility of adding "and influence'’ to 
"special interests*5 and deleting a reference respecting 
China's territorial sovereignty.-^
^ F o reign Office, Cable 377# Sato to Motono, Sep­
tember 28, iy17, 1shli 24 (received).
^Foreign Office, Cable 358, Motono to Sato,
October 12, l§l7# fo Ishii 11 (sent).
^Foreign Office, Cable 435# Sato to Motono,
October'13, ityif, tsHii 40 (received).
Lansing, soon made it clear that "and influencew would 
net he added to the declaration. The American Secretary 
said that "influence” was incorporated into nspecial 
interests#i? and more importantly, if added would add to 
confusion and misunderstanding. He reiterated to Ishii 
that the reason diplomatic notes were to he exchanged 
between the United States and Japan was to establish 
"perfect” understanding between the two countries* The 
injection of such a phrase would be contrary to the pur­
pose of the meeting* and, as such was the case, the 
American Secretary would not agree.^
On the subject of deleting the phrase "territorial 
sovereignty nevertheless remains unimpaired” from para­
graph four, Lanaing asked for further time to think about 
it.56
In commenting about the day*a encounter, Ishii 
reported to Tokyo that the American attitude on the 
addition of "and influence" was very firm. Ishii thought 
the position so firm, in fact, that he recommended that 
the point be dropped as Japanese insistence would be 
unprofitable and indeed might Jeopardize the entire 
declaration.^
55lbld.
56lbid.
57Ibid.
According to the Lansing memoirs, Ishii had promised 
him on the 10th to e&bl? Tokyo concerning the section "and 
that they will not take advantage of present conditions to 
seek; special righto or privileges in China which would 
abridge the rights of the citizens or subjects of other 
friendly states."^® This apparently was done on the 13th.®® 
Ishii tried ones more to change Tokyo*s mind as Lansing had 
tied deletion of this section to deletion of "ether” from 
the sentence, "Moreover they mutually declare that they 
are opposed to acquisition by any other government of any 
special rights or privileges that would affect the inde­
pendence or territorial Integrity of China.
The Viscount carefully drew Motono*s attention to 
the fact that the clause dealing with opportunism would be 
in effect as long as "present conditions" existed. Thus, 
Ishii pointed out, although binding and restrictive for 
the moment, as soon as the war ended its efficacy would 
be concluded#
In commenting on Lansing*s quid pro quo, Ishii 
pointed out Its long term nature, and the fact that it
^Lansing, op. cit., p. 299*
^Foreign Office, Cable 437, Sato to Motono, October 13*
1917* Ishii 41 "('race
6oXuid.
6lIbid.
86
would have the effect of making Japanese special Interests 
meaningless. If "other” were deleted, the sending of 
Japanese military advisors to China might prove impossible* 
Ishii concluded his very concise review of the Issue by 
suggesting that Japan should restrict Its activity during 
the immediate future and admit to the restraint of the 
section in question. To do otherwise would tie Japan to 
an indefinite commitment ftso clearly unprofitable *
Discussions continued on the 13th. 3 The two diplo­
mats again reviewed In detail the question of deleting 
"territorial sovereignty remains unimpaired” from para­
graph four. Lansing said the United States would agree 
to Its omission, but that in view of President Wilson1s 
desires, respect for China*s territorial sovereignty 
would have to be Indicated by the addition of "sovereignty” 
to the phrase "territorial integrity of China." Lansing 
recommended it be added right after "integrity.”
Ishli did not like the idea, and observed that the 
phrase in question had been used originally in the Root- 
T&kahira Agreement and to now add "sovereignty” would 
create misunderstanding. In his report, Ishii once again
62Ibid.
Foreign Office, Cable 439, Sato to Motono, October 13, 
1917, Ishli 4& (received on the 15th).
6^Ibid.
8?
recommended to his government that "territorial sovereignty 
remains unimpaired” be retained as it appeared In the 
original draft. He thought that its Inclusion could be 
profitable to Japan, and then all the American counter- 
suggestions could be disregarded,®-*
After discussing the above change, Lansing and Ishii 
moved on to a reconsideration of the self-denial phrase 
"they will not take advantage#” Ishil*s report reveals 
that he indicated Japan's continued desire to have it 
deleted from the declaration. Lansing replied that to do 
so, three conditions would have to be met. The word "other” 
would have to be deleted as discussed before. "They mutu­
ally declare” would have to be changed to "they severally 
declare,11 and "in the same way” should be added after 
"they are opposed*” He then Indicated initially that the
deleted section might appropriately be placed in a secret
* 88note.
Ishii* s own views on this section of paragraph four 
were unchanged. He reiterated his opinion to the Ter&uchi 
government as was detailed in cable 422. To change the 
original draft on this section would prove unprofitable 
to Japan. As far as the new conditions were concerned, he 
recommended only that the government think about them.^
65rbld.
6,6 Ibid.
67Ibid.
88
Ishli concluded his report of this meeting with a 
lengthy review of his deteriorating relationship with 
Lansing. Ishii observed that since he tried to add "and 
influence" to the declaration, the American Secretary of 
State’s attitude had become stiff and hard. He felt that, 
at least, conversations were strained. Ishii stated that 
he had indicated a need to see President Wilson, but Lansing 
had informed him of Its impossibility. The Viscount warned 
that in the present atmosphere, bargaining had practically 
ceased. "If now we miss this opportunity, It will be 
extremely difficult to settle■the Chinese problem between 
America and Japan. So, even if seme difficulties and
68disadvantages exist, we should exchange official notes.1
The Foreign Ministry replied to Ishil’s message on the 
15th of October* Motono acceded to certain of the special 
ambassador’s arguments, and agreed to retention of the 
phrase "territorial sovereignty remains unimpaired.M 
However, concerning the phrase, ,}They will not take 
advantage," the Foreign Minister was adamant, and main­
tained that it should be deleted.^
Several days later, the Viscount dispatched a message 
which placed particular emphasis on Lansing’s scheme to
^Ifald
Cable 366, Motono to Sato, October 15
89
exchange secret notes to supplement the public decla- 
TOration. Ishli reviewed his initial reaction and said 
that he had not Indicated to Lansing any particular feeling 
on his proposal* However, the Japanese special ambassador 
pointed out to the Galmusho that he was really at a loss 
to formulate an effective argument to counter Lansing's 
latest proposition* “So,w he continued, "I'll have to 
indicate approval of the secret note idea.” Ishii stated 
that If he did concur, he would make one more try to get 
Lansing to agree to the retention of ”other” in the para­
graph four phrase Hany other government *” Ishii asked for
instructions and a draft, in the event the government
71decided In favor of exchanging secret notes*
Motono replied with unusual rapidity and clarity*
Ishii was not to agree to the idea of secret notes as 
Motono insisted it would foe impossible to keep them 
secret* Their existence would be leaked to the public, 
and then the significance of the contents would foe 
exaggerated without basis. In addition, the Minister for 
Foreign Affairs mentioned that there always existed the 
possibility that Germany would use these notes as a 
means to separate Japan from America. He Insisted that
^Foreign Office, Cable 444, Sato to Motono, October 18, 
1917, Ishil43 (received).
71Ibld.
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the entire concept was out of place in view of the present 
good relations between Japan and America*^
Ishii was told to try to get Lansing to agree to a 
sltirple deletion of the section beginning nand that they 
w ill  not take advantage” and in return ”other” could be 
deleted from ’'any other government. ” Motono*a tone 
reflected exasperation as he concluded the message with,
,rI hope this satisfies him* Desire that you finalise 
this note*1 ^
Armed with these rather definitive instructions,
Ishii met Lansing on the 20th to resume discussions* He 
explained the disadvantages Inherent In an exchange of 
secret notes, and submitted that as an alternative,
Japan could agree to deletion of "other” and then in
*Th
compensation, there would be no secret notes.*
Lansing replied that the deletion of 1 other” was a 
necessity indicating that its use as a barter item was
^ F oreign Office, Cable 372, Motono to Sato, October 18, 
1917# To lahfl IS '(lent) *
73ibld.
"^ Foreign Office, Cable 452, Sato to Motono, October 21, 
1917# IsHil '% '(received). The date of the meeting in this 
cable ia listed as October 17thj however, this is believed 
to be a typographical error. Lansing lists a meeting on 
the 20th, Ishil*s itinerary, as found In the Foreign Office 
Microfilms, shows no meeting on the 17th, and the message 
Itself was received In Tokyo on the 21st. All evidence 
Indicates a meeting on the 20th rather than the 17th*
not to be considered. However, he did say that he would
lahii relayed the change in Tokyo1s attitude con­
cerning the phrase "territorial sovereignty remains 
unimpaired •11 Lansing agreed to its retention, and 
informed Ishli that he was dropping the idea of adding
Finally, the Japanese envoy proposed that the "them" 
in  the phrase "geographical position gives them” he made 
more specific. Xshii suggested it be amended to read
At the next negotiating session on the 22nd, the 
American Secretary of State notified the special envoy 
that the United States would not Insist on secret notes, 
and would be satisfied If the Japanese would furnish some 
special memorandum explaining the deletion of the section 
concerning the two nations* self restraint in China.^ 
Ishlifs cable to the Foreign Office relates how he 
explained the Japanese position so many times to Lansing
talk to the president on this point.*^
sovereignty” or "sovereign rights" to that paragraph
"Japan," but Lansing simply said
TSlbid.
7 6 Ib id . 
7 7 Ib ld .
'"Foreign Office. Ca 
1917, Ishil 43 ''(received)
ble 456, Sato to Motono, October 23
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regarding a simple deletion of the section in return for
deletion of "other,1 but Lansing was unmoved.*^
Evidently President Wilson was insistent that some
form of written record exist declaring that Japan did not
intend to take advantage of the war in Europe to further
its aims in China* Ishil recognized this and recommended
to Motono that to continue debate over the subject would
certainly increase doubt as to Japan*s protestations not
to use the war for self advantage*®^
At the meeting on the 22nd, Lansing gave Ishil a
draft of a memorandum to cover the self denial section.
Ishli indicated to Motono that the final portion of the
draft memorandum was "not very Interesting and he wanted
it d e l e t e d * Lansing promised, Ishil reported, that
the memorandum would not be leaked to the press, but would
be kept secret In his files. The American draft was
reported as follows?
Confidential Memorandum to Accompany the Reply of 
The Japanese Government.
In the preliminary draft Note, dealing with 
questions relating to the Republic of China which 
are mutual interest to Japan and the United States, 
and which on September 26th 1917 were/was(?) 
submitted by the Government of the United States 
to the Government of Japan for their consideration, 
there appeared, following the declaration by the
79Ibid.
80Ibid.
8 3-Ibid.
two Governments of their adherence t o  the so-called 
“open-door” policy, a further declaration that 
“they will not take advantage of present conditions 
to seek special rights and privileges in China 
which would abridge rights of citizens or subjects 
of other friendly states*”
For certain reasons of expedience which have 
been orally explained to the Government of the 
United States, the Government of Japan considered 
it to be unwise to include above quoted, declaration 
in the proposed note, and it was therefore stricken 
out by mutual consent*
In order, however, to avoid misconstruction 
being placed upon this amendment of the not#, the 
Government of Japan desire to affirm that by so 
doing there was no purpose, on their part, to 
assert a contrary ,,/JElg/principle or policy, and 
that the elimination of the declaration has no 
significance whatsoever In determining the terms 
of the Note as finally agreed upon by the Govern­
ment of His Majesty*
(Signed)82
Foreign Minister Motono replied to Ishil*s latest 
cable and the draft memorandum on the 26th of October* 
Viscount Motono repeated his feelings about the undesir­
ability of such a document, but noted that, HIf America 
doesnft bend her position, at the final point we may have 
to agree Motonofs mood seemed extremely Irritable as
he chided the American© for doubting Japan1s true inten­
tions* He commented that the memorandum certainly was not 
appropos in view of current good relations, and that upon 
close scrutiny, it was a one-sided declaration by the
^Foreign Office, Cable 457, Sato to Motono, October 24 
1917, tfoTSSIT number (received)*
^Foreign Office, Cable 330, Motono to Sato, October 26 
1917, To Ishil iT(Sent)•
Japanese government. He agreed with Tshli that the section
from 11 and that the elimination” should be deleted, but
Motono went one step further and called everything after
84the second paragraph uninteresting or undesirable *
As a substitute for the American memorandum* Motono
introduced the possibility of a protocol. Such a document
would be executed by both parties* and if misunderstandings
were to arise in the future, it could be made public. He
informed Ishii that a draft protocol would be sent in
85another encoded message*
In the event of American nonconcurrence in the 
protocol, Motono instructed the special envoy to recommend 
a change in the American memorandum. He was emphatic that 
this measure was to be adopted only as a last resort* The 
Foreign Minister suggested that the paragraph that began 
11 In order however*1 could be changed to read, "It was well 
understood that the principle coitamnlcated In the decla­
ration which was thus suppressed was in perfect accord 
with the policy actually pursued by the two Governmenta 
In China."86
On the same day, October 26th, the draft Protocol 
was cabled to Ishii. It reads
8hbid.
85Xbld.
^Itold.
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PROTOCOL
In the course of the conversations between the 
Japanese Special Ambassador and the Secretary of 
State of the United States, which has led to the 
exchange of notes between them dated this day, 
declaring the policy of the two Governments with 
regard to China, the question of embodying the 
following clause in such declaration cane up for 
discussion?
^They /the Government of Japan and the United 
States/ will not take advantage of the present 
condition to seek special rights or privileges 
In China, which would abridge th© rights of the 
subjects or citizens of other friendly states/*
Upon careful examination of the question it 
was agreed that the clause above quoted, being 
superfluous In the relations of the two Govern­
ments, and liable to create erroneous impression 
in the minds of the public, should be eliminated 
from the declaration.
It was however well understood that the principle 
enunciated In the clause which was thus suppressed 
was in perfect accord with the policy actually 
pursued by the two Governments in China.®*
The two statesmen conferred again on the 27th. Ishii
reported that after some discussion, Lansing indicated
that he would withdraw the American memorandum* The
American Secretary of State regretted the way in which the
Japanese Government was Interpreting American moves during
the .negotiations as if America were doubting Japan's
Intentions* He Insisted that America wanted everything
mutual in Intent as well as style. In light of these
developments, Lansing intimated that he was planning to
88make a third proposal.
^Foreign Office, Cable 381, Motono to Sato, October 26, 
1917# To Ishii IB'"(sent).
®®Foreign Office, Cable 464, Sato to Motono, October 28, 
1917. isMi W  T received).
lahil Informed Lansing that Japan did not want a 
memorandum., and offered as a substitute, the draft Protocol. 
After explaining the Japanese position regarding this decla­
ration, Ishii said that he was to explain that his govern­
ment was eager to conclude the negotiations,®^
Lansing replied that the protocol would be taken 
under consideration. As the two men left the room,
Lansing commented that he also rather wished to end the 
discussions, and Implied that the protocol might be the 
means to end the current impasse'.90
In the message reporting this meeting Ishii informed 
the Oaimusho that the Korea Maru had been reserved for the 
9th of November* The special envoy wanted to leave as 
soon as possible, and asked Tokyo to get everything ready 
for an exchange of notes.^
Motono1s reply of the 29th, primarily dealt with 
procedures for releasing the notes to Britain and Bussia.
The two countries had been kept Informed of the progress 
of the negotiations through the Japanese Ambassadors In 
Kussia and Britain, Jchida and Chinda respectively. 
ishii was told to cable both ambassadors and. Japan when
89ibia. 
9°Xbld. 
91Ibid.
the notes were exchanged * ino foreign Minister instructed 
Ishii definitely not to mention the contents of the
Lansing and Ishii met on the 2 9th, to discuss the 
draft Protocol submitted by Japan on the 27th. Lansing 
had checked with fefilson and requested to make one minor 
change* He observed that the section f,policy actually 
pursued** did not include reference to the future* and it 
might cause confusion or misunderstanding* Lansing, 
recommended that it be changed to read "with the declared 
policy of the two governments in regard to China, 11 The 
Americans accepted all other sections of the Protocol.
Ishii sent the change to Tokyo with the comment 
that on the 27th, Lansing had seemed quite satisfied 
with the draft1 however* after talking with the Presi­
dent* they wanted a change* Ishii believed that even 
the added phrase did not commit Japan to future restraint 
so he recommended it be accepted*®^
On the 3ist, Motono dispatched his approval of the 
Protocol change., and informed Ishii that authorisation
^Foreign Office* Cable 389, Motono to Sato, October 29 
1917# To 'Isfflti W T a e n t ).
protocol*^
^Foreign Office, Cable 466* Sato to Motono, October 29 
1917, fSKil 55 (recelved on 31®t}*
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to exchange notes would be cabled on November lst*®5
The Japanese Foreign Office, also on the 31st, sent 
messages to the Japanese Ambassadors in Britain and Russia* 
These cables alerted the two, Chirida in Britain and Uehida 
in Russia, that the negotiations had finally been con­
cluded, and that within three days the resulting notes 
would be exchanged* They were instructed to inform the 
Foreign Ministers in their assigned countries of this 
fact, and to hand them copies of the notes as soon as 
possible* The Protocol was not to be disclosed, but
96there was a possibility that in the future it would be*
Motono cautioned the Japanese diplomats that Germany 
may try to make some propaganda capital from the exchangej 
overall, he thought that the negotiations and notes 
revealed a strong United States-Japanese alliance, and 
he believed that the agreement would prove beneficial not 
only to the United States and Japan but also to China 
The release of the text of the notes prior to the 
public exchange between the United States and Japan was 
only being done by Japan noted the Foreign Office* The
^Foreign Office, Cable 393, Motono to Sato, October 31 
1917# To ishii' 51 (sent)
^Foreism Office. Cables 733. 734. Motono to Chinda,
97lbld.
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United States would not release the notes to anyone prior 
to their official exchange*^®
The next day* November 1st, Motono informed Ishii that 
all the necessary procedures had been completed In Japan, 
and that Tokyo was .ready for the exchange to take place*
He instructed the special ambassador to cable japan,
Britain and Russia as soon as the exchange took place, 
Chinda in Britain would cable France and Italy upon 
receipt of the Ishii message. He reported that public 
release of the notes was set for November 7th, or as soon 
thereafter as possible. He asked Ishii to cable Tokyo If 
anything relating to the method for disclosing the agree­
ment cam© up in his discussions with Lansing
Motono followed up the above message with Instructions 
to Ishii- to prepare a 11 thank you” note for Lansing* He 
specifically wanted to thank the American Secretary for 
helping to expose the German plot against close United 
States-Japanese cooperation, and for freely discussing 
all matters affecting the relations of the two countries. 
The Foreign Minister wanted this letter ready for presen­
tation at the exchange of notes or as soon thereafter as
... 100possible•
98lbld.
99fforejgn Office# Cable 39^* Motono to Sato, 
November"*!",' 15177’To Tshii 22 (sent),
i®®Foreign Office, Cable 39&* Motono to Sato,
November"1, iyiY, To Ishii 23 (sent).
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After receipt of Motonofs cable,, discussed immediately
above# Ishii met with Lansing and settled the manner of
releasing the notes* He reported to the G&lmuaho that the
release would be "simple° as was desired by the Japanese
government# and would be accompanied by a statement by
Lansing* Ishii commented that he recommended to Lansing
that release of the notes be about three days after the
exchange* The Japanese Special Ambassador feared that a
longer delay would be likely to lead to a leak of the
101In f or ma11on prernaturely.
Ishii continued his report on the accomplishments of
the day's meeting including a discussion on such minor
details as the signature element for himself# and the
lack of one for Lansing! the changing of an ffalf to a
"the" In the American copy of the Protocol# and other
30?minute information#
On the 2nd of November# in fokyo, Motono penned
instructions for the Japanese representative in Peiping,
the Baron in Cable 807, he directed Hayaahi to*
* ♦ * meet Chinese authorities on November 4, and 
tell them the meaning of coded message 808, and 
hand them a copy of the note* Cable their
101Foreign Office, Cable 476, Sato to Motono, Novem­
ber 2, l W 7 T i h T r ^ { r e c e i v e d ).
102Ibld.
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reactions. However, the copy of the note for the 
Chinese government is only in English (not Japa­
nese), Also* dcn*fc tell them at all about the 
Protocol. So* please be reminded. On November 1st, 
the British* French, Bussi&n and Italian Ambas­
sadors resident in Japan were told privately . . . ♦ 
Official notes will be exchanged on the 2nd or 3rd.
A few days after the exchange it will be released. 
So, up till that time, please remind the Chinese 
government to keep it secret.
Cable 808, mentioned above which was to be briefed to 
the Chinese only reviewed the fact the United States- 
Japanese diplomatic discussions had taken place* The 
Chinese were to be told that the results of the negotia­
tions would improve the relations between the United States 
and Japan, and would reflect a "correct and friendly” policy 
by the two governments toward China. Motono concluded 
encoded Cable 808 with, " I  believe Asia will have peace 
and security.
The day after instructing Hayashl to notify the 
Chinese of the Impending exchange of notes, Tokyo received 
one of Ishiifs last cables from Washington. The special 
ambassador reported a conversation with Lansing on the 
2nd during which the American Secretary had specifically 
observed that China was not among the nations to be 
notified by Japan of the official exchange.
^ ^Foreign Office, Cable 807, Motono to Hayashl,
November"27
K^Foreign Office, Cable 808, Motono to Hayashl, 
November12, lylT^
^Foreign Office, Cable 477, Sato to Motono,
November 3, l9lY7"T3Hii 56 ( re c e i ve d } .
—I r r\
Ii -i.*5 ilOC* de&i‘ X^hiX * fc> Piiply to juUii*^ X 1 Ag W«JLJJ
however, in tins cable ai suggested that China definitely
ohoul vi to notIV 1c%** I.** 1 uc w^  he owssA'v^ cii sa.iiiw ucicil i/iotiui
 ^06
c x p l a t - i a t - k o n  »*< & u X d  o ti i i i  o r c iu x  a o r  w n o n 1 t w a e x  x  v «
Motono., in a rather rapid reply, i-eminded Ishii that 
the scheme for notifying Allied countries prior to release 
cf the notes was available to Sato, arid trial it made 
provision for alerting only four countries, Lritain, 
Russia, France, and Italy* For some reason, Motono 
was Steeping his special representative In the dark con­
cerning the release to China* In any ease, this catla 
clearly exonerates Ishii from any knowledge of coming 
events.
On the same clay that Motono dispatched the above 
t o ssage, he received one that had been awaited eagerly 
for several months. Cable 479 from the Viscount in 
Washington, notified the Oaimusho that the notes had been 
exchanged on the morning of the 2nd• Ishii had signed 
two copies of the protocol, and had kept one. Release 
was to be on the 7th in Tokyo, and In Washington on the 
afternoon of the 6th. The Naval Agreement was to be 
released by Lansing at the same time
lo6ibia.
^ T p 0ralgn Office, Cable 405, Motono to Sato, 
November 3, 19i77 fo^fshll 28 (sent).
^^Foreign Office, Cable 479* Sato to Motono, 
November~*3T"T3T7* Xshii 5& (received).
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Ishii*s closing words In this message were, "Going
to leave tomorrow afternoon, November 3, 1917.
Motono Quickly dispatched a thank-you note to Ishii
which cited all the hardships that had been overcome by
the Viscount satisfactorily to complete the negotiations
110and exchange notes*
On the 4th, Motono received Ishii*s last dispatch 
from the American capital. In it the special ambassador 
reported what l^anslng1© statement would contain when the 
notes were released* Generally, tensing was going to cover 
the facts that the notes would remove all misunderstanding, 
assure continued friendship for both countries, keep peace 
in the Orient, and demonstrate to enemy nations a strong 
unity between the United States and Japan* His state­
ment, the Viscount concluded, would commend the part
illplayed by the Japanese Special Ambassador.
Ishii left Washington for the West Coast on the
u p
evening of November 3rd. As he traveled a drama, was 
unfolding in Peiping about which the special ambassador 
had no advance knowledge*
109lbld.
llOgorelgn_ Office, Cable 409, Motono to Sato,
November '3, lylYT ‘"foTshil 29 (sent).
II^Foreign Office, Cable 482, Sato to Motono,
November 4,r iylY,'’ IshTi 59 (received) *
H ^Foreign Office, Viscount Ishii*3 Itinerary, Film 431*
104
Baron Hayashl, as instructed by Minister for Foreign 
Affairs Motono# called on the Chinese Foreign Minister to 
deliver confidentia l information on the Just concluded 
Japanese*-American negotiations* Finding him sick# he 
dutifully contacted the Deputy Foreign Minister and 
explained the events of the Immediate past***3
After carefully studying the note# the Chinese diplo­
mat replied# "Germany attempted to disrupt American- 
Japanese relations using Chinese affairs which is so 
stated in the Mote* So# a t this time# to have agreement
between America and Japan is c erta in ly  suited to the
«114current situation.
The Chinese official additionally noted that he
would inform the appropriate government officials eon-
115coming this matter*
Hayashl# in his report# recounted the above event, 
and added that he would fee visiting Prime Minister Tuan 
in the a f t e r n o o n This he did* In noting Tuan*s 
reaction# Hayashl reported that the Chinese Prims 
Minister had thanked him for the private notification#
H 3poreign Office# Cable 1530# Hayashl to Motono# 
November 4#' I9I7 *
ll4ibia.
115Ibld.
ll6Ibld.
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but had Indicated that he wanted to think about it for 
awhile because of its importance to China***7
The Inevitable happened* That against which Ishii 
had warned the Foreign Office occurred* Soon after the 
confidential release to the Chinese* by coincidence or 
intent* the news of the agreement was leaked
According to the American Minister Keinseh* the 
Chinese* after their private exposure to the notes* 
expressed the belief that they had been fores&ken by the 
United States. Chinese dismay, and* it might be added, 
that of Keinsch* was abject***®
In the meantime* quite oblivious t© these develop­
ments* ishii sped westward to arrive in San Francisco on 
the 8th of November*
The next day* Ishii telegraphed a farewell message 
to Lansing and boarded the Korea Maru for Japan * On the 
morning of the l6th* 'the Ishii Party arrived in Honolulu*
and that afternoon they were once again on the high sea®
121and headed for Yokohama.
*^Foreign Office, Cable 153^# Hayashl to Motono*
N ove mbe ^ ¥,1917^
ll8ftelnaeh, jgg. £ii*» P* 312.
119Ibld.
l^OporelKn Offlea, viscount Isiill*s Itinerary. Film 432. 
iaiIbld., Film 433.
The welcomed sight o f Mount F u ji In  the w inter was 
Is h ii*a  once again as the Korea Mama arrived a t the port 
of Yokohama on the 26th of November.
12£Ibld., Film 433.
CONCLUSION
In assessing the Ishii Mission and its success or 
failure* one must return to the instructions which 
Viscount Ishii received from the Terauchl Cabinet. A 
brief recapitulation of the main points reveals the 
followingt
1* Ishii was ordered to meet President Wilson 
and deliver congratulations from the Emperor on America's 
entry into the war*
2. Ha was to negotiate a pact on Pacific security  
and related matters. The extent of Japanese participation 
in this pact was to be based on American desires.
3. The special ambassador was directed to make 
Japan's thoughts and desires clearly known to the United 
States relating to China and the Japanese living in the 
United State®.
4. Finally, he was to indicate Japan's concern 
about post war disposition of the German Pacific Islands.1
The mission accomplished three points satisfactorily. 
Ishii clearly fulfilled the instructions of points one,
^Foreign Office* Letter, Decisions of the Cabinet 
Counci 1 on 5fiel‘'TsElT Mission and fnstrucTTons for Viscount
T S K I T r M y ^ , 1 5 I 7 . --------------------------- - --------
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two and four; however# point three which encompassed 
the complex problems of Japanese-American relations in 
China, as well as the immigration issue requires closer 
examination*
I t  was hoped that the mission would be able to
eradicate the causaa of concern and misunderstanding
between the United States and Japan. In referring to
this, Ishii1s instructions stated In parti
The American policies at which the Japanese are 
chagrined are the American political and economic 
activities In China and the unfair and prejudicial 
treatment of Japanese in the United States*
The notes finally exchanged between the two nations 
did not curtail in  any way the American economic and 
political activity which had given original Impetus to 
the months of negotiations. The United States did not 
agree to restrict Its economic activities to non~Japa~ 
nese areas of interest nor did i t  agree to Japanese 
management of American investments* In fact, Lansing 
Informed Ishii of American intent to lend up to ten 
m illio n  dollars to China, and the fact that America 
seemed to support Chinese troop Involvement in Europe.
In that respect, the American political and economic 
thorn was not removed from Japan1s side.
The mission evidently relegated the task of 
Improving the lot of the average Japanese resident
^Ibid.
109
of the United States to tertiary importance. On the 26th 
of September, Ishii obtained Lansing* a commitment to con­
tinue discussions on the Bryan-Chinda Agreement with 
Ambassador Sato. This was the only concrete item realised 
in conjunction with the immigration problem.3
Attempts by the mission to mollify or restrict 
American political and economic interference In China and 
improve the conditions for the Japanese living in America 
were less than successful. The Ishii Mission did not# 
therefore# completely satisfy the instructions of the 
Cabinet Council directive.
Due to the ambiguity of the notes, the Japanese 
were still able to reap considerable diplomatic capital.
By having the most re s tr ic tiv e  phrases# as fa r  as Japa­
nese policy was concerned# confined to the confidential 
Protocol# Japan was able to interpret the agreement to 
the rest of the world as American recognition of its 
preeminent position in China.
Ishii# himself, If not convinced that he had won 
recognition of Japanese preeminence in China at least 
was convinced that he had obtained a Monroe Doctrine In 
Asia for Japan. This interpretation was possible as he
^Foreign Office# Cable 332, Sato to Motono, Sep- 
tember 23, T§lT# "isHii 26 (received).
^Ishii, op. clt., pp. 124-132.
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considered that an Asiatic Monroe Doctrine would In no 
way conflict with the independence or territorial 
integrity of China which the notes recognised*5
In  the end, tensing and Ishii agreed to recognize 
Japan*a special interests In return for a reaffirm ation  
of Japan1a respect for the open door* respect for China's 
territorial integrity, and a statement denying Intent to 
use the war for disproportionate gains in China* It 
enabled the United States to keep Japan out of G e m any*a 
awaiting arms for the period of the war, and in return 
was ambiguous enough to satisfy Japanese purposes*
The real significance of the notes to Japan appears 
to  have been in  the way they put them to use in their 
relations with China. Helnsoh states that Chinese dis­
may over the notes was translated Into a stronger influence 
of the pro-Japanese clique In the Peiping government j 
this group was instrumental in concluding the secret 
jap&nese-Chlnese negotiations of 1918. "Through these 
agreements Japan obtained China1s de facto recognition 
of Japanese interests in S h a n t u n g To China these
^Foreign O ffice* Cable 381, Sato to Motono, Sep-
tember^SB, TSlT, TSill 25 (received)*
^Reinsch, op. cit., p. 316.
^John Edgar Endicott, "Japanese Aspirations at the 
Paris Peace Conference, 1919” I unpublished paper, Depart­
ment of History, University of Omaha), p. 13*
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treaties of 19X8 were ultimately more damaging than the 
agreements resulting from the Twenty-one Demands as 
duress was not involved.
The Lansing-Ishii Agreement cannot be considered 
Instrum ental in the conclusion of these treaties, but 
it can be said that It helped to create an atmosphere in 
which the secret accords became realities.
Although the notes contributed in some small way to 
strengthening Japan's apparent position in relation to 
China, there was neither a winner nor loser, vanquished 
nor victor in this brief episode of Amerlcan-Japanese 
diplomatic relations. The two nations retreated behind 
the screen of ambiguity to conceal from the world basic 
areas of unrecone11able national objectives*
This convenient arrangement lasted a brief six 
years. By 1923 notes had become embarrassing and 
were superseded by the Washington Treaties*
Ishii had Journeyed to the United States with 
instructions which reflected a confident, almost arrogant, 
Japan. In America he encountered a new idealism almost 
completely devoid of the pragmatism of past American 
administrations. Forced to negotiate from a rigid 
Japanese position and faced with an equally unbanding 
American attitude, Ishii sought to obtain an agreement 
which had only the hallmark of victory, not the substance.
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Is h ii rea lised , 1 a® sure, b e tte r than meet th a t hie  
nation and the one he had Just v is ite d  would u ltim ate ly  
clash on the solution o f the problems momentarily tabled  
by the Lanslng~Xshil Agreement.
APPENDIX
THE PINAL AGREEMENT 
(FROM THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO VISCOUNT ISHII)
DEPARTMENT OF STATE,
Washington, November 2, 1917.
Excellency«-
I have the honor to communicate herein my under­
standing of the agreement reached toy us in our recent 
conversations touching the questions of mutual interest 
to our Governments relating to the Republic of China*
In order to silence mischievous reports that have 
from time to time been circulated, it is believed toy 
us that a public announcement once more of the desires 
and intentions shared by our two Governments with regard 
to China is advisable*
The Governments of the United States and Japan 
recognize that territorial propinquity creates special 
relations between countries, and, consequently the 
Government of the United States recognizes that Japan 
has special interests in China, particularly in the 
part to which her possession© are contiguous*
The territorial sovereignty of China, nevertheless, 
remains unimpaired and the Government of the United States
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has every confidence in the repeated assurances of the 
Imperial Japanese Government that while geographical 
position gives Japan such special interests they have no 
desire to discriminate against the trade of other nations 
or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore granted 
by China in treaties with other Powers.
The Governments of the United States and Japan deny 
that they have any purpose to in frin ge  in any way the 
Independence or territorial Integrity of China and they 
declare furthermore that they always adhere to the prin­
ciple of the so-called "open door" or equal opportunity 
for commerce and industry in China,
Moreover* they mutually declare that they are opposed 
to the acquisition by any Government of any special right© 
or privileges that would affect the independence or terri­
torial Integrity of China or that would deny to the sub­
jects or citizens of any country the full enjoyment of 
equal opportunity In the commerce and industry of China,
I  shall be glad to have Your Excellency confirm 
this understanding of the agreement reached by us,
Accept, Excellency, e tc . etc, etc.
ROBERT LANSING1
1goreIan Office, Diplomatic Note from Lanaing to Is h ll,  
November* g J'liaa 253-234.
1X5
(FROM VISCOUNT ISHII TO THE SECRETARY OF STATE)
JAPANESE EMBASSY* 
Washington* November 2, 1917#
Sirs
I have the honor to acknowledge the receipt of 
your note of to-day* communicating to me your under­
standing of the agreement reached by us in our recent 
conversations touching the questions of mutual Interest 
to our Governments relating to the Republic of China*
I am happy to be able to confirm to you, under 
authorisation of my Government* the understanding in 
question set forth in the following terms s
In order to silence mischievous reports that have 
from time to time been circulated* it is believed by us 
that a public announcement once more of the desires and 
intentions shared by our two Governments with regard to 
China is advisable.
The Governments of Japan and the United States 
recognise that territorial propinquity creates special 
relations between countries* and* consequently the 
Government of the United States recognises that Japan 
has special Interests in China* particularly in the 
part to which her possessions are contiguous*
The b ..rritordal sovereignty of China* nevertheless* 
remains unimpaired and the Government of the United States
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has every confidence in the repeated 'assurances of the 
Imperial Japanese Government that while geographical 
position gives Japan such special interests they have 
no desire to discriminate against the trade of other 
nations or to disregard the commercial rights heretofore 
granted by China in treaties with other Powers.
The Governments of Japan and the United States deny 
that they have any purpose to infringe in any way the 
independence or territorial integrity of China and they 
declare furthermore that they always adhere to the prin­
ciple of the so-called Mopen door” or equal opportunity 
for commerce and Industry In China*
Moreover, they mutually declare that they are opposed 
to the acquisition by any Government of any special right® 
or privileges that would affect the Independence or terri­
torial integrity of China or that would deny to the sub­
jects or citizen® of any country the full enjoyment of 
equal opportunity in the commerce and industry of China.
I take etc. etc. etc.
K. ISHII
Ambassador Extraordinary and Pleni-
2potentiary on Special Mission.
2Foreign Office, Diplomatic Note from Ishii to Lansing, 
November "2, a'9T7$ Mims 258-260.
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THE TOXTKjD STATES-JAFANESE NAVAL COOPERATION NOTE
Complete and satisfactory understanding upon the 
matter of the naval cooperation in the Pacific for the 
purpose of attaining the common object against Oenaany 
and her Allies have been reached between the
Representatives of the Imperial Japanese Navy who is 
/£±&7  attached to the Special Mission of Japan and the 
Representatives of the United States Navy.^
^Foreign Office, Cable 480, Sato to Motono, November 2, 
1917 (received“nMoviHber 3# 1917)*
1 1 8
ISHII1 B F A m m h L  LETTER TO LAN SI M
My final departure from Washington affords a fit 
occasion for m© to express once more to the American 
people my deep sense of gratitude for the cordial reeep-* 
tlon and hospitality accorded to the special mission of 
Japan, The spontaneous and enthusiastic manifestations 
of friendship and goodwill toward us on all hands have 
profoundly Impressed not only the members of the mission 
but the whole Japanese people* The kindly feeling and 
fraternal spirit always existing between the two nations 
have never been more emphatically testified. Believing 
aa I do In frank talking I have tried the beat I could, 
in my public utterance© in this country, to tell the 
truth and the facts about my country, the aspirations 
and motives which spur my nation, for to my mind it is 
misrepresentation and the lack of information that allow 
discordance and distrust to creep in the relationship 
between nations* I am happy to think that at a time 
when the true unity and cooperation between the allied 
nations are dire necessities, It has been given me to 
contribute in my small way to a better understanding and 
appreciation among the Americans with regard to Japan. 
The new understanding In regard to the line of policy 
to be followed by Japan and America respecting the
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Republic of Chins augurs well for the undisturbed main­
tenance of the harmonious accord and good neighborhood 
between our two countries. It certainly will do away 
with all doubts that have now and then shadowed the Japa- 
nese-Amerlcan relationship. It cannot fall to defeat for 
all time the pernicious efforts of German agents to whom 
every new situation developing in China always furnished 
so fruitful a field for black machinations. For the rest 
this new understanding, of our*s substantiates the soli­
darity of comradeship which Is dally gaining strength 
among the honorable and worthy nations of the civilised 
world. It is a great pleasure for me to add that this 
declaration has been reached as an outcome of free exchange 
of frank views between the two Governments. I cannot pay 
too high a tribute to the sincerity and farsightedness 
of Secretary Lansing with whom it was my privilege to 
associate in so pleasurable a way* It is my firm belief 
that so long as the two Governments maintain a perfectly 
appreciative attitude toward each other, so long as there 
is no lack of statesmanship to guide public opinion, the 
reign of peace and tranquility in our part of the world 
will remain unchallenged.
(Signed)^
^Foreign Office, Letter, Ishli to Lansing, November ?,
1917*
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